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Central to this thesis are problems in which a group of users can benefit from
building and jointly using some kind of infrastructure, be it a set of supply depots,
service stations, or a communication or transportation network. We study two
important questions related to these kinds of scenarios: (1) how to build the shared
facility that satisfies the needs of a given set of users in a cost-effective way, and
(2) how to split the cost of the shared facility among the participating users in a
fair and reasonable way.
In the first part of the thesis, we seek to design cost sharing functions with
desirable game-theoretic properties. We are looking for cost sharing functions that
are fair, and encourage cooperation among users. This is captured in the notion
of cross-monotonicity: it says that a cost share of any user should never increase
as more people join the system, and never decrease when players leave. Towards
this end, we develop a new technique to generate such cross-monotonic cost shares
using a primal-dual type process, and use it to design cross-monotonic cost shares
for several NP-hard optimization problems.
In the second part we proceed in a slightly different direction, applying cost
sharing to the design of approximation algorithms. We consider a class of two-stage
stochastic problems with recourse. In these problems, we can buy building blocks
(edges, facilities, vertices. . . ) in two stages. In the first stage, the elements are
relatively inexpensive, but we do not know the requirements of users we will have
to serve (we only have a probabilistic forecast of their demands). In the second
stage, the actual demands are revealed, and we must buy enough elements (now
at a higher price) to satisfy all user demands.
We show that whenever the underlying deterministic problem admits a certain
type of cost sharing, an extremely simple strategy gives us good approximation
guarantees: in the first stage, take several samples from the forecasted distribution,
and build a solution that covers all the sampled clients at the low price. When the
real users materialize, augment the first stage solution to cover the actual demands.
In this way we obtain constant approximation algorithms for stochastic versions
of problems like Uncapacitated Facility Location, Steiner tree, Steiner Forest or
Vertex Cover.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Martin Pa´l was born on the 4th of January, 1977 in Brezno, in a wonderful country
once called Czechoslovakia. The country managed to get rid of the communist rule
in 1989, but got split into two by two unscrupulous guys who both wanted to be
prime ministers. As a result, in 1993 Martin became a citizen of Slovakia.
Martin graduated form high school named after a Slovak mathematician Jur
Hronec in 1995 and received a “magister” degree from a university named after the
“Great Didactic” John Amos Comenius in June 2000. He hopes to receive a PhD
from Cornell University, named after an American telegraph-builder Ezra Cornell,
in January 2005.
In his previous life he used to do a lot of competitive fencing, and everyday
commute to college got him addicted to biking along the beautiful banks of the
Danube river. Besides biking, he spent most of his free time as a volunteer running
the Correspondence Seminar in Programming, a mail contest for high school kids.
He got married recently and did not yet have a single opportunity to regret this
move.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks. It sounds that I might have made it at last. Thanks to everybody who has
helped me to pull through all these years. Thanks to my advisor, E´va Tardos,for
being with me through all my whinnings and complaints and excuses and for all
the nudges necessary to get me all the way to this point. And, well, thanks for all
the advice without which I would be hopelessly lost. Thanks to David Shmoys,
who has shown me what it takes to be a great teacher; his scheduling course may
well be the best class that I’ve ever taken. Thanks to Johannes Gehrke and Jon
Kleinberg for serving on my committee; I only wish I had used more opportunities
to benefit from their guidance.
Thanks to my housemates Mark Sandler, Alex Slivkins and Ivan Lysiuk for
stimulating after-midnight discussions on a number of scientific an non-scientific
topics. It was great to be a part of a purely theoretical office with Tom Wexler,
Ara Hayrapetyan and Zoya Svitkina – I will miss you guys.
I am glad to have met a number of wonderful people at conferences and other
meetings; their example keeps convincing me that a career as a computer scientist
can be more interesting than that of a shepherd or a bus driver after all. I am much
indebted to my co-authors and collaborators; fruits of collaboration with Luca
Becchetti, Anupam Gupta, Jochen Ko¨nemann, Amit Kumar, Stefano Leonardi,
R. Ravi, Tim Roughgarden, Amitabh Sinha and E´va Tardos are the substance
of this thesis. Special thanks to Anupam, who has shown me that long-distance
collaboration can not only be successful and productive, but also a lot of fun.
Finally, thanks to Lucia, who had the patience to wait for me for four long
years.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Cost Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Primal-dual algorithms and cost sharing 8
2.1 Minimum spanning trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Steiner trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Vertex cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Cost sharing and incentive compatibility 15
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.1 Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1.2 The problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.3 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1.4 Our Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 The Facility Location Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2.1 A Linear programming formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.2 The Jain-Vazirani algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.3 The supremum trick . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.4 Smoothing out the dual: the ghost process . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.5 Fault tolerant facility location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Single Source Rent-or-Buy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 The ghost process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2 Cost shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.3 Building a solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.4 Bounding the tree cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.5 Cost Recovery and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4 Approximation via Cost Sharing 57
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Model and Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.1 Cost sharing functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Approximation via Cost Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3.1 Algorithm: Boosted Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.4 Stochastic Steiner Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5 Other Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5.1 Facility Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5.2 Vertex Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.6 Independent Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.1 The (Even Simpler) Algorithm Ind-Boost . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.6.2 Steiner forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6.3 Unrooted Steiner Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
v
4.6.4 Facility Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.5 Vertex Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.7 Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Multicommodity Rent-or-Buy 88
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.1.1 Our Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.2 Rent-or-Buy as stochastic Steiner forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.2.1 Some Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.3 The Steiner Forest Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.3.1 The Algorithm PD and the Cost Shares ξ . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.4 Proof of Theorem 5.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4.1 Proof of Strictness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.2 Finally, the book-keeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 Group Rent-or-Buy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5.1 Proving strictness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.5.2 The tree spanning terminals of g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Bibliography 120
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 The Jain-Vazirani algorithm is not cross-monotonic. . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 If αj < t(p)/3, then c(p, q
′) < 2t(p). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 A client connected to multiple growing components. . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Clients i and j connected to a component C at time t. . . . . . . . 52
5.1 The Goemans-Williamson algorithm does not support strict cost
sharing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is about the interplay of two areas: combinatorial optimization and cost
sharing, the art of dividing up the costs associated with building and maintaining
a shared property among the group of agents who benefit from it. Our prototypical
example would be a computer or communication network, built to satisfy the needs
of a number of users. The first question we need to address is: how to design a
good network, one that satisfies all requirements, while minimizing the overall
cost? What is the cost of the optimal network? Once the cost is determined, the
second question arises: how to distribute this cost among all users that participate
in the network in a fair way?
1.1 Cost Sharing
On an abstract level, a cost sharing problem is specified by a set (universe) of
users (called also players, agents or clients interchangeably) U and a cost function
c : 2U 7→ R+. The cost function specifies, for any given set S ⊆ U of users how
much would it cost to build a solution that satisfies all users in S.
Example 1.1 (building a bridge) Suppose each user i ∈ U has a need to regu-
larly cross a river. To satisfy this need, a bridge has to be built, at cost M . Once
the bridge has been built, any number of users can use it at no additional cost. Of
course, if no users are served, there is no point in spending money on building the
1
2bridge. This would ssugest a cost function of the form
c(S) =


0 if S = ∅
M if S 6= ∅.
Instead specifying the cost function explicitly as in Example 1.1, we will usually
have to deal with cost functions defined implicitly, as the solution to a combina-
torial optimization problem.
Example 1.2 (spanning tree) Suppose our users want to receive periodical up-
dates from a news provider. The provider is located at a source node r, and our
goal is to build a network that connects all users to the source node. A reasonable
idea would be to build a broadcast tree rooted at the source node r that spans
all the users. Assuming that distances among clients can be modeled by an undi-
rected weighted graph, a minimum spanning tree on the clients and the source
node would be a good candidate for our broadcast network. Hence the resulting
cost function would be given by
c(S) = Cost(MST(S ∪ {r})),
where MST(S ∪ {s}) denotes a minimum cost spanning tree on the vertices S ∪
{s}.
Throughout this thesis, we will consider a number of combinatorial optimization
problems Π. Like in Example 1.2, each problem will be specified by a universe
of users U (called also clients, customers, or players interchangeably), each user
having a requirement she wants to be satisfied. For a given subset S ⊆ U of users,
the problem Π(S) is to find a solution Sol that satisfies the requirements of every
3user in S and has minimum cost. The minimum cost solutions to the optimization
problem naturally define a cost function:
c(S) = Cost(Π(S)).
The goal of cost sharing is to devise a scheme that specifies how to divide the
cost (or profit, for profit sharing schemes) among the agents participating in a
given enterprise.
A cost allocation is simply a vector x = {xi}i∈U of non-negative real numbers
with one coordinate for every user i ∈ U . The value xi specifies how much the user
i is supposed to contribute towards the common goal.1
Studying cost allocations for a fixed set of users has its own merits. In this
thesis, however, we will be more interested in relationships among cost allocations
for different sets of users, and changes in the cost allocation as the underlying set
of clients changes. Towards this end, we define a cost sharing function that can be
thought of as a collection of cost allocations for all possible sets of users.
Definition 1.3 A cost sharing function (sometimes called also a cost sharing
method) is any function ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+.
For a given set of users S, the value ξ(S, i) specifies the cost share of user i,
assuming that S is the set of users being served. By convention, if i /∈ S, we define
ξ(S, i) to be 0. Thus, if we fix a set of clients S, then ξ(S, ·) (more precisely, the
vector {ξ(S, i)}i∈S) is a cost allocation for the client set S.
1Some works, most notably game theory textbooks, require any cost allocation
to satisfy
∑
i∈U xi = c(U). For our purposes it will be more convenient to defer
this requirement to a separate definition (Def. 1.6) and allow cost allocations to
be arbitrary non-negative vectors.
4Remark 1.4 Definition 1.3 allows some rather uninteresting cost sharing func-
tions. For example, an all-zero function is a valid cost sharing function according
to this definition. We shall impose restrictions on cost sharing functions (Defi-
nitions 1.6 and 1.7) that relate the cost sharing function to the actual cost, as
well as two additional properties studied in depth in subsequent chapters: cross-
monotonicity (Def. 3.1) and strictness (Defs. 4.2 and 4.14)
Example 1.5 (Cost sharing for MST) One possible cost sharing function for
the Minimum Spanning Tree problem from Example 1.2 is the following. For
any set S ⊆ U of clients, let TS be the minimum cost tree spanning the vertices
S ∪ {r} (in case there are multiple minimum spanning trees for S ∪ {r}, pick TS
according to some consistent tie-breaking rule, e.g. lexicographically smallest).
For each vertex (user) i ∈ S (that is, any vertex except the root) there is a unique
first edge e(i) on the path from i to r (in other words, e is the edge between i and
its parent). We can define a cost sharing function simply by demanding that every
user pays the cost of its parent edge: ξ(S, i) = c(e(i)).
The cost sharing function from Example 1.5, although extremely simple, will
be useful in Section 4.4 to derive an approximation algorithm for the stochastic
Steiner tree problem. The details on how to do this appear in Chapter 4. For now,
let us point out one desirable (and almost obvious) property of our cost sharing
function: the cost shares should pay for the cost of the solution we construct.
Definition 1.6 A cost allocation x is budget balanced, if
∑
i∈U xi = c(U). A cost
sharing function ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+ is budget balanced (with respect to a cost
function c(·)), if for each set S ⊆ U , the cost allocation ξ(S, ·) is budget balanced,
that is, if
∑
i∈S ξ(S, i) = c(S) for all S ⊆ U .
5It is easy to check that the cost sharing function ξ from Example 1.5 is budget
balanced. Throughout this thesis, we shall strive to design budget balanced cost
sharing functions; however in many cases this turns out to be an unattainable goal.
Instead, we may have to settle for a somewhat lesser goal: the sum of cost shares
should come within some multiplicative factor of the overall cost. In the following
definition, α ≥ 1 is a real number.
Definition 1.7 A cost allocation x is α-approximately budget balanced, if
∑
i∈U
xi ≤ c(U) ≤ α
∑
i∈U
xi.
A cost sharing function ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+ is α-approximately budget balanced
(with respect to a cost function c(·)), if the cost allocation ξ(S, ·) is α-approximately
budget balanced, i.e. if
∑
i∈S
ξ(S, i) ≤ c(S) ≤ α
∑
i∈S
ξ(S, i)
for all S ⊆ U .
It will often be convenient to separate budget balance into two independent
properties: the first part is called competitiveness, while the later (approximate)
cost recovery.
Definition 1.8 A cost sharing function ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+ is competitive (with
respect to a cost function c(·)), if ∑i∈S ξ(S, i) ≤ c(S), and α-cost recovering (or
satisfying α-cost recovery) if c(S) ≤ α∑i∈S ξ(S, i) for all S ⊆ U . Analogous
definition holds for cost allocations.
The cost function from Example 1.2 can be computed in polynomial time:
indeed, there are many efficient polynomial time algorithms for computing a min-
imum cost spanning tree (see, e.g. [26]). Unfortunately for most problems of
6our interest, computing the cost function is NP-hard: for example, if we replace
minimum cost spanning tree by a Steiner tree, we already arrive at an NP-hard
optimization problem. This is bad news in two ways. From a mathematical stand-
point, a function that is NP-hard to compute is often very hard to understand and
usually lacks any succint mathematical description. It also means that in general
we cannot hope to discover structural properties of the cost functions that could
aid us in the design of the “right” cost sharing functions.
From the standpoint of a computer scientist, NP hardness means that some-
thing has to be sacrificed: either we give up polynomial running time, or live
with algorithms that do not always produce the optimal answer. Our choice is
to go with approximation algorithms: they are an important paradigm by itself,
and the linear programming tools they use (especially primal-dual algorithms) are
particularly useful in designing good cost shares.
The following chapter, Chapter 2, serves as a quick overview of some established
primal-dual approximation algorithms and techniques that we will be building
upon in subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 3, we develop methods to compute cost sharing functions guaran-
teeing that the cost share of any individual user never increases as the pool of
served users grows. This property, called cross-monotonicity, has useful game the-
oretic implications: the existence of such cost sharing suggests that the available
resources can be effectively shared, as there is no competition for a scarce resource.
New players are welcome to join, as their arrival can only help old users utilize their
service at a lower price. Cross-monotonic cost sharing is also the main ingredient
in the construction of some truthful mechanisms.
7Chapter 4 defines strict cost shares. Informally, strictness states that if we
want to extend an old network to accomodate the needs of a group of newly ar-
rived users, the cost shares of the new users cover the expenses of this extension.
We shall see that strict cost shares are a useful tool for designing approximation al-
gorithms. We study a class of two-stage stochastic optimization problems and show
that whenever the underlying deterministic problem admits a certain cost sharing
scheme, we can lift an approximation algorithm for the deterministic version and
use it to obtain an approximation algorithm for the stochastic problem.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we use construct strict2 cost sharing for the Steiner Forest
problem, which enables us to give an approximation algorithm for the Multicom-
modity Rent or buy problem, a network design problem with economy of
scale.
2Technically, we obtain only a weaker form of strictness, that is still sufficient
for our purposes.
Chapter 2
Primal-dual algorithms and cost sharing
Nearly all cost sharing functions we know how to construct come from some kind
of dual-growing process. In this chapter, we would like to mention two of them.
The minimum spanning tree algorithm of Kruskal [64] is usually not viewed as a
primal-dual algorithm; however, analyzing it in this way leads us to a different way
of defining cost sharing functions for trees (and forests). The second process is part
of a simple 2-approximation algorithm for the Vertex Cover problem. A third
dual-growing algorithm should perhaps be mentioned here: the 3-approximation
algorithm of Jain and Vazirani [52] for Metric Facility Location. After some
deliberation, we decided to leave its discussion to Chapter 3, where we make heavy
use of it.
There is a linear program hidden behind every primal-dual algorithm. While
sometimes it is more convenient to work with this linear program directly, more
often than not we try to define our algorithms and work with them without an
explicit appeal to the underlying linear program.
2.1 Minimum spanning trees
Given an undirected graph G = (V,E) with non-negative weights on edges, the
Minimum Spanning Tree problem is to select a set of edges of minimum cost
so that there is a path between any pair of vertices using only the selected edges.
There is a number of efficient algorithms for finding minimum spanning trees,
both sequential [22, 79, 64] and distributed [7]. Here we focus on the well-known
algorithm of Kruskal [64], and interpret it as a primal-dual algorithm. In the
8
9following, we shall always assume that the graph G is connected.
Kruskal’s algorithm sorts all edges of the graph in the order of increasing length,
and considers them in this order. It maintains a list of selected edges that is initially
empty. For each edge e = (uv) in order it checks whether there is a path between
vertices u and v consisting of only selected edges. If yes, edge e is discarded; if not,
e is added to the list of selected edges. In both cases, the algorithm proceeds with
the next edge in the ordering. The algorithm stops when it exhausts all edges.
It is a well known fact that Kruskal’s algorithm is a valid MST algorithm.
Theorem 2.1 (see, e.g.[26]) Assuming the graph G is connected, the list of se-
lected edges forms a minimum spanning tree of G.
Let e1, e2, . . . , en−1 be the list of edges output by Kruskal’s algorithm (n = |V |
is the number of vertices of the graph). An obvious way to compute the cost of
the MST is to add up the cost of individual edges:
Cost(MST) =
n−1∑
i=1
c(ei). (2.1)
Let us suggest a different way of computing the cost. We can think of all the
edges ofG as being laid on a real line, with each edge e covering the interval [0, c(e)].
Imagine a pointer t moving continuously from zero to plus infinity: whenever the
pointer hits the rightmost point of an edge e (which happens at time t = c(e)) the
edge is processed by the algorithm (some sort of tie-breaking has to be employed
for edges of equal length). The contribution of each edge is equal to the length of
the interval it covers (some intervals will be covered multiple times). To express
the cost of the MST, we can divide the real line into smaller sub-intervals, and add
up the lengths of the sub-intervals, counting each sub-interval with multiplicity
equal to the number of times it is covered.
10
To find out how many times is a given point t ≥ 0 on the real line covered by
selected edges, let us look at the state of the algorithm after processing all edges
with c(e) < t. Let Gt be a subgraph of G consisting of all edges of length less than
t. Note that two vertices u, v belong to the same component of Gt if and only if
they are connected by a path of edges already selected by the algorithm. Since
addition of each selected edge reduces the number of components by one, and in
the end there will be only one large component (i.e. G = G∞), it follows that at
time t, the number of edges that Kruskal’s algorithm will yet select (which is equal
to the number of edges that cover t) is one less than the number of components of
Gt. If we use κ(Gt) to denote the number of components of Gt, we can write
Cost(MST) =
∫ ∞
0
κ(Gt)− 1 dt. (2.2)
Example 2.2 (Cost sharing for MST II) Equation 2.2 allows us to attribute
the cost of the MST differently, allowing us to define an alternative to the cost
sharing function from Example 1.5. This alternative cost sharing function will sat-
isfy cross-monotonicity, a property useful for designing strategyproof cost-sharing
mechanisms as we shall see in Chapter 3.
Equation 2.2 says that to sustain the growth of the spanning tree, we have to
pour in κ(Gt) − 1 “money” per time unit at any given time t. In other words,
we have to pay one unit of money per time step for each component of Gt except
one. Bearing with the setup of Example 1.5, it is clear that the exempt component
should be the component containing the root vertex: the root itself is not a player
and hence should not be charged. It would also not be fair to charge users who are
already connected for the growth of the rest of the tree. For each of the non-root
components, we shall split the cost of growth equally among the users (vertices)
11
in that component.1
To compute the cost share of a particular user, let Cj,t denote the component
that user j belongs to at time t. If we define
aj(t) =


1
|Cj,t|
if s /∈ Cj,t
0 if s ∈ Cj,t,
, (2.3)
we can write the cost share of the user j as
ξ(S, i) =
∫ ∞
0
ajt dt. (2.4)
One way to think about (2.3) is that the root vertex s has infinite weight, and
hence |Cj,t| = ∞ if s ∈ Cj,t.
By the preceeding discussion, it is clear that the cost sharing function ξ recovers
the exact cost of the MST and hence is budget-balanced. Moreover, ξ satisfies
Definition 3.1 which will prove useful in design of strategyproof mechanisms in
Chapter 3.
2.2 Steiner trees
A spanning tree of a set S ⊆ V of vertices is a tree that spans exactly the vertices
in S; whereas a Steiner tree of the set S is a tree that spans all vertices of S, but is
allowed to pass through other intermediate vertices (called also Steiner vertices).
The Minimum Steiner Tree problem is then, given an undirected graph G with
weights on the edges, and a set S of vertices, to find a Steiner tree of S that has
minimum cost.
1There is no particular reason (except a desire for symmetry) for equal split.
In fact, Jain and Vazirani [51] propose a whole class of cost sharing functions
generated obtained by varying the splitting rule.
12
Unlike minimum spanning tree, the minimum Steiner forest problem is NP-
hard; hence we cannot hope to obtain an algorithm that solves it optimally in poly-
nomial time. The currently best approximation algorithm for Minimum Steiner
tree by Robins and Zelikovsky [82] achieves approximation ratio 1.55; here we
sketch a simple 2-approximation that better fits our purposes.
Clearly, every spanning tree of S is a valid Steiner tree of S; and (if the under-
lying graph is a metric), every Steiner tree can be converted into a spanning tree
on the same set of terminals while at most doubling its cost. This suggests the
following approximation algorithm for the Steiner Tree problem:
1. Compute the metric closure G′ of the graph G. The metric closure G′ of G
is a complete undirected graph with each edge (u, v) of G′ having cost equal
to the cost of the shortest path from u to v in G.
2. Find a minimum spanning tree T on the required vertices S in the graph G′.
3. Convert T into a valid Steiner tree in G by replacing each edge e = (u, v) ∈ T
by its shortest u-v path in G. Note that this operation does not increase the
cost of the tree.
We state the following theorem without a proof (the proof is easy and can be
found in most algorithms textbooks, see e.g. [90]).
Theorem 2.3 The above algorithm is a 2-approximation algorithm for the Stei-
ner tree problem. Hence, the cost sharing function given by Equation (2.4)
(multiplied by 1/2) is a 2-budget-balanced cost sharing function for the Steiner
Tree problem.
13
2.3 Vertex cover
Vertex Cover is one of the oldest NP-hard problems — it has been proven NP-hard
by Karp in his seminal paper [56]. It is very simple to state. Yet, although it has
number of simple approximation algorithms, none of them achieves approximation
ratio better than (essentially) 2 (see [90, 6]).
The Vertex Cover problem is given by an undirected graph G = (V,E) and
a non-negative cost c : V 7→ R+ on vertices. The goal is to find a minimum cost
vertex cover, that is, a set of vertices V ′ ⊆ V such that every edge e ∈ E has at
least one endpoint incident at a vertex from V ′ (that is, e is covered).
Vertex Cover has a number of simple approximation algorithms using a maximal
matching or a depth-first search tree of the graph (for unweighted graphs), the
local-ratio technique of Bar-Yehuda and Even [12], as well as LP-rounding and
primal-dual approaches. The simple primal-dual algorithm presented below best
fits our purposes, because it outputs useful cost shares.
The algorithm maintains a variable αe for each edge e, that are initially set to
zero. We keep increasing all variables at an uniform rate, until the edges incident
to a vertex v can pay the opening cost of v, that is, until
∑
e∈δ(v) αe = cv. At this
point, we declare the vertex v tight, and we freeze all edges incident to v. We stop
raising the variables of frozen edges. We keep raising variables of unfrozen edges
until another vertex goes tight, another edges freeze and repeat this process until
all edges are frozen. In the end, we output the set C of frozen vertices as the vertex
cover, and define the cost share ξ(E, e) of each edge to be equal to αe at the end
of the algorithm.
Claim 2.4 The set of tight vertices C is a valid vertex cover.
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Proof. Each edge is frozen only when one of its endpoints becomes tight. Since
in the end, all edges are frozen, each edge must be incident to a tight vertex.
Claim 2.5 The sum of cost shares
∑
e∈E αe is a lower bound on the cost of an
optimal vertex cover C∗.
Proof. Fix the set C∗. Let us assign each edge e = (u, v) to one of its endpoints,
that is in the vertex cover C∗. If both endpoints are in C∗, assign e to one of them
arbitrarily. Note that since C∗ is a valid vertex cover, each edge is assigned. For
each vertex v, let A(v) be the set of edges assigned to v.
∑
e∈E
=
∑
v∈V
∑
e∈A(v)
≤
∑
v∈V
ce, (2.5)
where the inequality follows from the fact that
∑
e∈δ(v) αe ≤ cv, i.e, no vertex is
ever overpaid by the cost shares.
Claim 2.6 The cost of the set of tight vertices C is at most 2
∑
e∈E αe.
Proof. For each tight vertex we have ce =
∑
e∈δ(v) αe. Hence the total cost of
the vertex cover is ∑
v∈C
∑
e∈δ(v)
αe ≤ 2
∑
e∈E
αe, (2.6)
where the inequality holds because on the left hand side, each edge is counted at
most twice.
Chapter 3
Cost sharing and incentive compatibility
The bulk of this chapter is based on the paper, Group Strategyproof Mechanisms
via Primal-dual Algorithms by Pa´l and Tardos [77]. Section 3.2.3 is based on a
project for a game theory class [76] taught by Eric Friedman.
3.1 Introduction
Large networks, such as the Internet, are developed, built, and operated by co-
operation of a large number of Autonomous Systems, all of whom act selfishly.
These independent “agents” are willing to work together when such cooperation
helps them achieve their goals. In this chapter we study the cost sharing problem,
when a group of agents agrees to install or maintain a jointly used facility, such
as a shared network, and split the cost among themselves. We picture the agents
coming to an agreement with an independent service provider, who promises to set
up the jointly used service in return for certain payments from the participating
users.
Ideally, the users and the provider should arrive at a contract that is self-
enforcing, that is, an agreement honored by all parties simply because violating it
does not benefit anybody. We are interested in identifying situations where such
self-enforcing contract (at least in an appropriately defined approximate sense) is
possible.
The question we are trying to answer is how to agree on a set S ⊆ U of
users that will be part of the network, and how to determine the payments to the
provider so that all players would be content with the decision. In particular we
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want that no agent would have an incentive to change her mind about whether to
participate in the agreement, and that no subgroup of users would want to deviate
because a cheaper alternative has become available.
If the set S of users being served is fixed, what remains is the problem of
determining the vector of payments for users in S. If, however, we allow S to
change, we need to worry about the changes of the user’s cost shares, and the
impact of this change on their behavior. In this chapter, we study cost shares
with the natural property that when the set of served users expands, the cost
share of any current user can either decrease or stay the same, but can never go
up. Cost shares with this property are called cross-monotonic. Intuitively, cross-
monotonicity encourages cooperation among the users: as adding new participants
can only lower the cost, there is no reason for a hostile action of any user against
newcommers, or any current users with the intention of removing them form the
game.
Definition 3.1 A cost sharing function ξ : 2u × U 7→ R+ is cross-monotonic, if
for all users i ∈ U , and any two sets of users S, S ′ such that i ∈ S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ U we
have
ξ(S, i) ≥ ξ(S ′, i).
Modeling the users
Suppose that each potential user i ∈ U has a private utility ui of being connected
to the network. The user is not willing to pay more than her utility for the benefit
of being a member of the network, and if she is asked to pay a share that is higher
than her utility, she prefers to stay disconnected.
Unfortunately for many games of interest, cross-monotonic budget-balanced
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cost sharing methods do not exist. It is well known that such methods provide
cost allocations that lie in the core, a well studied concept in the game theory
literature [74], and that the core is empty for these games. Motivated by the
research effort on approximate core (e.g., [31, 23, 37]), we relax budget balance by
require the users only to recover certain fraction of the total cost.
Definition 3.2 A cost sharing function ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+ satisfies α-approximate
cost recovery, if ∑
i∈S
ξ(S, i) ≥ c(S)/α
for all S ⊆ U . A competitive cost sharing function that recovers an 1/α-fraction
of the cost is said to be α-approximately budget balanced.
Remark 3.3 We have chosen to relax cost recovery instead of competitiveness in
order to be consistent with previous work on approximate core. If we chose to
relax competitiveness instead, all our cost sharing methods would be multiplied
by the factor α.
3.1.1 Our Results
We give a general technique for using primal-dual approximation algorithms to gen-
erate cross-monotonic, competitive and approximately cost recovering cost shares.
The cost shares are closely related to the dual solution generated by the algorithm,
and hence the competitiveness and cost recovery properties are a consequence of
dual feasibility and the approximation guarantee of the algorithm. However, cost-
sharing directly based on linear programming duals does not usually deal well
with individual utilities: the resulting cost-sharing is not cross-monotonic, and
hence does not lead to group strategyproof mechanisms. Our technique changes
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the primal-dual approximation algorithm by striving to make the cost-sharing (the
dual growing process) as smooth as possible, avoiding sudden arbitrary jumps and
changes in the growth that could harm cross-monotonicity, even at the cost of
somewhat weakening the approximation ratio.
We apply our technique to two network design games. First, we illustrate it
by giving a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the Facility Location game,
and then proceed to the main result of the paper, which is a cross-monotonic cost
sharing method for Single Source Rent-or-Buy Network Design (also known as a
simple Access Network Design game). Both cost sharing methods are competitive,
while the former recovers 1/3 and the latter 1/15 of the cost of the optimal solution.
The bounds on cost recovery are shown by explicitly constructing a feasible solution
to the respective problems.
3.1.2 The problems
The facility location problem is given by a set of potential servers (facilities) F ,
and a set S ⊆ U of users. The problem is to open a subset of the facilities, paying
amount fp for each open facility p, and build a link from each user j ∈ S to some
open facility, given that the cost for connecting a client j to facility p is cjp. We
make the common assumption that c is a metric on F ∪ S (more precisely, on
F ∪ U). Let c∗FL(S) denote the cost of the minimum cost solution for the set of
users S.
In the single source rent or buy problem, we are given a set s of users and a
source s, residing in a metric space defined by a graph G, and a number M . The
goal is to build a tree that connects all users to the source, so that each edge e of
the tree can either be bought at cost Mce, or rented at cost ce times the number
19
of users that use the edge on their way to the sink. Similarly, let c∗RoB(S) be the
cost of the optimum solution.
In the corresponding games users are trying to decide on the set S of users who
should participate in the network, so that the participants can (approximately)
share the cost.
3.1.3 Related work
There is a large body of literature on cooperative games, mostly focused on fair
cost allocation (see e.g. [74]). A cost allocation is a vector x assigning each user
i ∈ U her share. It is fair, if no subset of users I is charged more than the optimum
cost, i.e.
∑
j∈I x(j) ≤ c∗(I) for every I ⊆ U . If it also recovers or approximately
recovers the cost, it is said to be in the core or approximate core.
It is easy to see that a cross-monotonic and competitive cost sharing method
automatically gives us fair allocations for all S ⊆ U :
Claim 3.4 Let ξ : 2U × U 7→ R+ be a cross-monotonic competitive cost shar-
ing function. Then for any set T ⊆ U of users, the vector ξ(T, ·) is a fair cost
allocation.
Proof. We need to show that no subset S ⊆ T of users is paying more than the
cost c(S) of serving them. This is a direct consequence of cross-monotonicity:
∑
j∈S
ξ(T, j) ≤
∑
j∈S
ξ(S, j) ≤ c(S).
The connection between the linear programming dual and cost-sharing is well
known, and has been used to build core and approximate core allocations for
various problems, including facility location [23, 37] and TSP games [31]. In fact,
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the classic Bondareva-Shapley theorem [21, 85] implies that for so called covering
games (in which the cost c∗(·) is given by the minimum cost solution to a covering
integer program), the core is nonempty if and only if the linear relaxation of the
game-defining IP has no integrality gap.
Moulin and Shenker [75] show that cross-monotonic cost-sharing leads to group
strategyproof mechanisms. They study the following simple mechanism for select-
ing the set of users S who should participate in the network: Start with assuming
that S = U . Repeatedly offer every user j who remains in S membership in the
network at price ξ(S, j), and keep removing users who decline at the price offered.
Stop when all remaining users in S accept the offer. Assuming that ξ is a cross-
monotonic cost sharing method, they prove that this mechanism induces users to
play truthfully, that is, accept whenever the price offered is less than or equal to uj
and decline otherwise. They prove that this mechanism is not only strategyproof,
but also group strategyproof, that is, no user or coalition of users can benefit by
deviating from the truthful strategy.
Moulin and Shenker [75] show that the classical Shapley value is in fact a cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method whenever the cost function c∗(·) is a submodular
function of the set S (see also [53]). The optimum solution to facility location,
Rent-or-Buy network design, or their LP relaxations are in general not submodular.
The only known cross-monotonic cost-sharing for a non-submodular cost func-
tion is the cost-sharing of Kent and Skorin-Kapov [57] and Jain and Vazirani [51]
for the spanning tree game. The spanning tree heuristic gives a 2-approximation
for the Steiner tree problem, hence the spanning tree cost-sharing method is also a
2-approximate budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing for the Steiner tree
game, which is a special case of the above Network Design problem with M = 1.
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Jain and Vazirani [51] pose the question of designing cross-monotonic cost
sharing for other combinatorial games. Recently, Devanur, Mihail and Vazirani
[28] used a standard primal-dual algorithm to provide a strategyproof cost sharing
mechanism for facility location. However, the resulting cost-sharing is not cross-
monotonic, and their mechanism is only individually strategyproof, not group-
strategyproof. In contrast, our technique modifies the algorithm to make the cost
shares cross-monotonic (and hence the resulting mechanism group strategyproof).
Much of the previous work on network design games [4, 10, 30, 48] focuses on
the Nash equilibria of the corresponding non-cooperative games. In its nature,
Nash equilibrium is a non-cooperative concept: the agents simply observe each
others behavior, and respond accordingly. Typically Nash solutions break down if
we allow the agents to cooperate. In contrast, our aim is to design a game that
allows the agents to follow a very simple truthful strategy, and such that the final
solution adopted by the agents is stable, meaning that no group of agents has
interest to change it.
From the plethora of approximation algorithms for facility location we mention
only the primal-dual 3-approximation algorithm of Jain and Vazirani [52], and the
currently best, 1.52-approximation algorithm of Mahdian et al. [69].
The first constant factor approximation algorithm for the Single Source Rent-
or-Buy Network Design problem is due to Karger and Minkoff [55] and Guha,
Meyerson and Munagala [39] (see also [40]). Both algorithms use a variant of fa-
cility location to gather the clients, and then build a Steiner tree on the set of
gathering points. Swamy and Kumar [88] gave a primal-dual 4.55-approximation
algorithm, that is also built analogously as a 2-stage algorithm (gathering fol-
lowed by a Steiner tree). Recently, Gupta et al. [44] gave a simple randomized
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3.55-approximation algorithm. Gupta et al. [47] announced that a derandomized
version of this algorithm also yields cross-monotonic cost shares for the Single
Source Rent-or-Buy game.
3.1.4 Our Techniques
Any cost sharing method ξ ′ can be made cross-monotonic by replacing it by a new
function ξ(S, j) = supT⊇S ξ(T, j). It is not hard to see that ξ(S, j) is population
monotonic. However, the new function may be much bigger than the original one;
and may not be easily computable. In Section 3.2.3 we give one example where
this approach succeeds; but we suspect that its general usefulness is limited.
Most of this chapter is dedicated to designing primal-dual algorithms that gen-
erate cross-monotonic cost shares. Our algorithms are simple dual-growing pro-
cesses that guarantee population monotonicity in a way analogous to the cross-
monotonic cost-shares ξ ′(S, j) above. Known primal-dual approximation algo-
rithms all are based on a “fair” way of raising cost-shares: all users increase their
cost-contributions uniformly until they are satisfied (the cost contributed so far
can pay for a facility they can connect to). The fact that these primal-dual al-
gorithms raise all players cost-shares evenly suggests that they may be useful for
building fair cost-shares. However, the resulting cost-shares are not population
monotonic: adding new users close to an existing agent i, makes it easier for agent
i to be satisfied, and once agent i stops raising her share, all remaining agents can
be negatively effected.
The idea that allows us to compute monotone cost-shares is to have a “ghost”
share for every user. Although in the original algorithm we are forced to stop
raising the user’s contribution in order not to over-charge some set of users, we
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still raise the ghost’s share until all users are satisfied. For example in the facility
location problem, considered in Section 3.2, the extra contribution from the ghosts
results in opening more facilities and users getting connected earlier than in the
original algorithm. This idea trivially ensures cross-monotonicity, as adding more
users (and their ghosts) can only cause more facilities to be open, and each indi-
vidual user satisfied earlier. The main challenge is to show that even that most
facilities are only virtually paid for by the ghosts, the real cost shares still pay
enough for constructing a feasible solution.
In Section 3.3 we consider the Rent-or-Buy network design game. Most known
approximation algorithms for this problem build the solution in a two phase pro-
cess: first they use a facility location algorithm to gather (or cluster) users into
larger groups, and then build a Steiner-tree on the set of gathering points. It
would be natural to try combining the cross-monotonic cost-sharing for the facil-
ity location problem of Section 3.2 with the spanning tree cost-sharing of Kent and
Skorin-Kapov [57] and Jain and Vazirani [51]. However, combining cost-sharing for
such a two phase process does not lead to cross-monotonic cost-shares: decisions
made in the gathering stage affect the way players contribute towards building the
tree in an unpredictable way, making it impossible to guarantee cross-monotonicity
of the second stage.
In Section 3.3 we extend the idea of ghosts to the Rent or Buy network design
game. We use the idea of a two stage process, gathering demand followed by
building a Steiner tree on the gathering points. To overcome the difficulty making
a two-phase process cross-monotonic, we run the two processes simultaneously,
adding all potential gathering points into the second stage as soon as they are
created by the first stage. Again, cross-monotonicity is easy: the more users we
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have, the more gathering points get opened, and earlier. More gathering points
means that also the tree gets built faster, only reducing the cost share of each
individual user.
As in the facility location case, the main challenge is to prove that the cost
shares can pay for a feasible solution. Note that since the first phase may open
much more gathering points than necessary (in fact, every point reachable by
enough users eventially becomes a gathering point), the cost of building a Steiner
tree on all of them would be prohibitively large. We thus need to select only a
suitable subset of the points, and relate the processes that builds a tree on the
selected points to the process on all potential points to show that the cost shares
generated by the latter process can pay for the tree built by the former.
3.2 The Facility Location Game
In this section we develop our cross-monotonic cost-sharing method for the metric
facility location problem. The facility location problem gives rise to very simple
and elegant primal-dual algorithms, and hence it provides a clean example to
illustrate how our “ghost” method turns a primal-dual algorithm into a cross-
monotonic cost-sharing method. In the next section we use these ideas to develop
a cost-sharing method for a more complex network design problem.
The Metric Facility Location game is given by a set F of possible facilities, a
universe U of users and a metric c(·, ·) on F ∪ U . Each facility p ∈ F has opening
cost fp. Given a subset S ⊆ U of users, the problem is to open a subset Q of
facilities, and connect each user in S to an open facility. The cost of a solution for
a given set of users S is the sum of the costs of facilities we open plus the sum of
the costs for connecting clients to facilities. The cost of connecting user j is equal
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to her distance from the closest open facility. Formally, the cost c(S) of a solution
for the set of users S is ∑
q∈Q
fq +
∑
j∈S
min
q∈Q
c(j, q),
where Q is the set of facilities we open. The players in this game are the users,
and our goal is to construct a solution and make each user pay certain amount to
recover a constant fraction of the cost of the solution constructed.
3.2.1 A Linear programming formulation
Consider the following integer program for metric facility location, due to Balinski
[11]. It has a variable yp for each facility p indicating whether facility p is open,
and indicator variable xpj for each client-facility pair specifying whether client j is
connected to facility p.
minimize
∑
j∈S,p∈F
xpjc(p, j) +
∑
p∈F
ypfp (3.1)
∑
p∈F
xpj ≥ 1 ∀j ∈ S
yi − xij ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ F, j ∈ S
xij, yi ∈ {0, 1}
We obtain a LP relaxation of this program by replacing the last set of constraints
by xij, yi ≥ 0. The dual LP is:
maximize
∑
j
αj (3.2)
αj ≤ cpj + βpj ∀p ∈ F, j ∈ S∑
j
βpj ≤ fp ∀p ∈ F
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The dual program has a variable αj corresponding to each usert that can in-
stantly be recognized as a candidate cost share for that user. The variable βpj is
best understood as a contribution of user j towards the cost of opening p. The
first set of constraints then says that the cost share of each user can be split into
a payment towards the connection cost (cpj) and a contribution towards opening
cost (βpj). The second set of constraints says that the sum of contributions to any
facility can never exceed its opening cost.
To obtain useful cost shares, we need to agree which solution to the LP (3.2) we
wish to use. One option would be to use an optimal solution to the LP. However,
there may not be a unique optimal solution. Even if there is, it can have undesirable
properties, like assigning zero cost shares to some clients, and it can be unstable
(a small perturbation, such as adding a client, can change the structure of the
optimal solution radically). To get a better hold of the dual solution, we will
use a primal-dual algorithm to generate it. The first and best known primal-dual
algorithm for facility location is due to Jain and Vazirani [52], which we proceed
to describe in the next section. The J-V algorithm does not give rise to cross-
monotonic cost shares; in the following two sections we give two approaches to
making them cross-monotonic.
3.2.2 The Jain-Vazirani algorithm
The Jain-Vazirani algorithm proceeds in two phases. In the first, dual-growing
phase it tries to generate as large dual as possible. In the second phase it uses
the dual constructed to pick a set of facilities to open and connect users to open
facilities. Here we focus mainly on the first phase of the algorithm.
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Phase 1 The algorithm starts with all dual variables αj set to zero. Each client
raises its dual variable at unit rate until it gets satisfied by being connected to an
open facility. The βpj variables merely respond to this growth in a minimalistic
way to maintain dual feasibility. Initially, we define each client to be unsatisfied.
An edge between a client j and a facility p is said to be tight if αj ≥ c(j, p).
In the beginning, there are no tight edges. As we raise the clients’ variables αj,
eventually some αj reaches the distance c(j, p) to a facility p. At this point, we
have to start growing the βpj variable in order to maintain dual feasibility. That
is, at all times we maintain the invariant βpj = max(0, αj − cpj).
A facility p is said to be paid for, if
∑
j βpj = fp. When a facility is p paid
for, the algorithm declares it temporarily open. It also declares all clients having a
tight edge to this facility to be satisfied and facility p is declared to be a wittness
for all these clients. We stop raising the dual variables of satisfied clients when
they get satisfied. If an unconnected client j gets a tight edge to an already paid
for facility, it is also declared satisfied and we stop raising its dual variable. The
first phase ends when all clients are satisfied.
Note that for each user j, the dual variable αj is equal either to the opening
time t(p) of its wittness facility (in case j has been contributing towards p) or to
the distance c(j, p) (in case p got paid for before the edge jp got tight). In any
event, αj ≥ max(cj,p, t(p)).
Phase 2 In the second phase, the J-V algorithm selects a subset of the set Ft of
temporarily open facilities to open permanently. To ensure that the cost of opened
facilities can be charged to the clients’s dual variables, it never opens two facilities
that have received positive contributions from the same client. We omit the details
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of this construction. However, Jain and Vazirani have proved the following.
Theorem 3.5 ([52]) The solution output by Phase 2 of the J-V algorithm has cost
at most 3
∑
j∈S αj, and hence the J-V algorithm is a 3-approximation algorithm
for metric facility location.
A reader wishing to see the full algorithm as well as a proof of Theorem 3.5 is
urged to read the original paper [52], or the textbook [90].
The dual variables produced by the J-V algorithm look almost like cost shares.
Indeed, we can define a cost sharing function ξ ′ in the following way: given a set S of
clients, we run the first phase of the J-V algorithm to obtain dual variables αj, and
define ξ(S, j) = αj for j ∈ S. By Theorem 3.5, the function ξ is 3-approximately
budget balanced. Is it also cross-monotonic? The following example provides a
negative answer to this question.
f1 = 2 f2 = 1
j1 j2
j3
Figure 3.1: The Jain-Vazirani algorithm is not cross-monotonic.
Example 3.6 Consider an instance with two facilities p and q with fp = 2, fq = 1,
and two clients, j1 and j2. Let the distances be c(j1, p) = c(j2, p) = c(j2, q) = 1
(see Figure 3.1), the remaining distances implied by the triangle inequality. The
J-V algorithm would raise both dual variables αj1 and αj2 until the facility p gets
paid for, where it declares both clients satisfied and stops. Hence each client ends
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up paying for its distance to p, and the cost of p is split evenly among them.The
resulting cost shares are ξ ′({j1, j2}, j1) = ξ′({j1, j2}, j2) = 2.
Now suppose we add a new client j3 located near facility q, i.e. c(j3, q) = 0.
Now the picture is different: user j3 starts to contribute to q immediately, causing
q to be paid for by time 1. Thus, user j2 will get satisfied at time 1 by connecting
to q, and stops raising αj2. That means, j2 does not contribute to p at all, which
means j1 has to pay for p by herself. Thus, ξ
′({j1, j2, j3}, j1) = 3 > ξ′({j1, j2}, j1).
3.2.3 The supremum trick
There is an easy way to make any cost sharing function ξ ′ cross-monotonic. Con-
sider the following function ξ:
ξ(S, i) = min
T :i∈T⊆S
ξ′(T, i). (3.3)
Instead of looking at only the amount ξ ′(S, i) that i is supposed to pay, we look at
the cost share of i in all possible subsets of S, and make i pay the smallest of these
cost shares. It is easy to see that the cost sharing function ξ is cross-monotonic:
the larger the set S becomes, the larger range of subsets S ′ is that the minimum in
Equation 3.3 is taken over. There are two obvious problems with this scheme. The
first problem is that in order to compute the minimum, we may need to examine
2|S|−1 values of ξ′. The second problem is that the new cost shares may be much
smaller, and may not recover a significant fraction of the cost, even if the original
function did.
Formula 3.3 has a natural “dual” version
ξ(S, i) = sup
T :S⊆T
ξ′(T, i). (3.4)
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The supremum is taken “over all supersets” of S. We have a little bit of freedom
here to specify what “all supersets” means: a simple option is to fix a finite universe
U in advance and take the supremum over sets T such that S ⊆ T ⊆ U .
In general, Formula 3.4 suffers from problems similar to that of Formula 3.3:
the supremum may be much larger than the original cost shares (potentially vi-
olating competitiveness), and computing the supremum means going through ex-
ponentially many (even infinitely many, if we allow U infinite). However, in the
case of metric facility location, we can get past these obstacles. In particular, the
“supremization” of the cost sharing function ξ ′ computed by the J-V algorithm
is approximately budget-balanced and computable in polynomial time. As a first
step in this direction, let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7 Let j be a user, and S, T two sets of users such that i ∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ U .
Then
ξ′(T, j) ≤ 3ξ′(S, j).
Proof. Consider running two instances of the J-V algorithm on the client sets
S and T . Assume ξ′(S, j) < ξ′(T, j), otherwise the lemma trivially holds. This
means that in th execution on S, the client j got connected to some open facility
p earlier than in the execution on the set T . Since j is still not connected in the
execution on T , it must be that the facility p is still not open in that execution.
How could that be? The only explanation is that there is a client j ′, that used to
contribute to facility p in the execution on S, but contributed less in the execution
on T . Hence in the execution on T , the client j ′ must have connected before time
ξ′(S, j) to some facility p′. But then,
c(j, p′) ≤ c(j, p) + c(p, j ′) + c(j ′, p′) ≤ 3ξ′(S, j).
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It means that in the execution T ′, client j will get connected to facility p′ by time
3ξ′(S, j), which is an upper bound on ξ ′(T, j)
Claim 3.8 The cost sharing function ξ defined by
ξ(S, j) =
1
3
sup
T :S⊆T⊆U
ξ′(T, j)
is a competitive, 9-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing method for metric
facility location.
Proof. Cross-monotonicity follows from discussion of Formula (3.4). Budget
balance follows from Theorem 3.5 and Lemma 3.7.
Computing ξ(·, ·)
Our next goal is to show that the cost sharing function ξ from Claim 3.8 can be
computed in polynomial time. In fact, we show that ξ(S, j) is the optimum of an
explicitly constructed linear program.
Consider a set S of users, and two users, j, k from this set. If j and k are
physically close to each other, we would expect them to behave similarly in the
J-V algorithm: they should connect to facilities at similar times, and hence the
times when they get satisfied should not differ too much. This intuition is captured
in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9 Let j and k be two clients, and consider the execution of the J-V
algorithm on some set of clients S such that j, k ∈ S. Let αj, αk be the dual
variables computed by the J-V algorithm corresponding to these two clients. Then,
|αj − αk| ≤ c(j, k).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume αj ≤ αk. Let p be the wittness facility
for j, that is, the facility that caused j to stop growing its dual variable. Then, we
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know that both the opening time t(p) of p and the distance c(j, p) are at most αj.
Thus, by the time max(c(k, p), t(p)) ≤ αj + c(j, k), either αk has stopped growing,
or it has achieved a tight edge to an open facility (namely, facility p)
To compute the supremum according to Equation 3.4, consider a fixed set of
users S, and imagine the J-V algorithm running on a larger set T ⊇ S of users.
How does the set of possible vectors of dual variables (αj)j∈S restricted to S look
like? It is not hard to verify that any such vector must be a feasible solution to
the linear program (3.2). In addition, we know that each pair of dual variables
must satisfy Lemma 3.9. This motivates the following definition. Let αS = (αj)j∈S
denote the vector of dual variables restricted to the set of users S. We define A(S)
to be the set of tuples αS for which there exist some βpj satisfying
αj − αk ≤ cjk ∀j, k ∈ S
αi − βpj ≤ cpj ∀p ∈ F, j ∈ S∑
j
βpj ≤ fp ∀p ∈ F
αj ≥ 0 j ∈ S
βpj ≥ 0 j ∈ S, p ∈ F
(3.5)
Clearly, the vector of cost shares αS generated by the execution of the J-V algo-
rithm on any T ⊇ S has to be in A(S). Interestingly, by adding enough clients in
strategic locations, we can achieve (at least in the limit) any vector in A(S) to come
as an output of the J-V algorithm. To make sure we can achieve this, we resort
to a little cheat. We allow adding new expensive facilities at strategic locations.
If we make the new facilities sufficiently expensive (M = |S|maxj,p c(j, p) + fp is
enough), these new facilities will never become paid for, and hence will not affect
the behavior of the J-V algorithm (the optimum solution also remains the same).
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Thus, the addition of these facilities does not change the cost shares ξ ′(S, ·), but
helps to ensure that
Lemma 3.10 For any set of users S and any strictly positive vector α′S ∈ A(S),
we can construct a superset T ⊇ S of users, and add |S| sufficiently expensive
facilities, such that the duals of the J-V algorithm on the new input restricted to
S will be equal to α′S.
Proof. For each client j ∈ S, we add a new facility pj of sufficiently high
cost M , such that c(j, pj) = α
′
j (the remaining distances follow from the triangle
inequality). We add M/α′j new clients
1 at distance zero from fp.
Now, let us observe the execution of the J-V algorithm on the new instance. We
use αj to denote the dual variables constructed by this execution of the algorithm.
Note that each of the new facilities pj gets opened exactly at time t(pj) = αj. This
means that the dual variable αj of each user j ∈ S stops growing at latest by time
α′j. Thus αj ≤ α′j.
We claim that each client j ∈ S gets satisfied exactly at time α′j, and hence
αj = α
′
j. To see this, assume the contrary and let j be a client who gets satisfied
at time t < α′j. This can happen only because j got a tight edge to a facility p
that got opened at or before time t. We claim that p cannot be any of the new
facilities pj′. To see this, note that the distance c(j, pj′) is too large: c(j, pj′) =
c(j, j ′) + c(j ′, pj′) = c(j.j
′) +α′j′, which by the first inequality of (3.5) is greater or
equal to α′j > t. Similarly, p cannot be any of the old facilities, and that follows
form the fact that α′S is a feasible solution to the dual program 3.2.
Thus, finding the maximum αj over all dual vectors in A(S) gives us the desired
1If this is not an integer, round M to the nearest multiple of α′j
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cost share.
Theorem 3.11 The cost sharing function defined by
ξ(S, j) =
1
3
max {αj | αS ∈ A(S)} (3.6)
is cross-monotonic, competitive, and recovers a 1/9 fraction of the cost of the
solution of metric facility location.
Our main contribution for the facility location game is to build cross-monotonic
cost-shares that recover a constant fraction of the cost of the optimal solution. To
define the cost-shares we use a “ghost-process” that can be viewed as a smoothed
version of a primal-dual approximation algorithm, such as Jain and Vazirani [51].
We will use a facility location algorithm by Mettu and Plaxton [70] for building a
primal solution. Their algorithm is a greedy in nature and does not come with a
dual solution or cost shares. As a byproduct, our analysis shows that the algorithm
of Mettu and Plaxton can be interpreted as a primal-dual algorithm. Archer et al.
[5] have also independently given a primal-dual analysis of this algorithm.
3.2.4 Smoothing out the dual: the ghost process
Now we proceed to describe a dual-growing process that smoothes out the sud-
den stops in the Jain-Vazirani algorithm. As Example 3.6 shows, non-cross-
monotonicity is caused by clients who suddenly stop raising their dual variable,
thus failing to help others to achieve their goal soon enough. The algorithm we
propose avoids this problem by keeping to raise shadows (ghosts) of dual variables
even after the real variable was forced to stop.
First we define a ghost process, and use it to define cost shares for each user.
For each facility p we define a neighborhood Sp of clients, the smallest set of clients
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such that charging each of them the same amount α = t(p) can cover the cost of
their connection, and enough is left over to pay for opening the facility. We will
not be able to charge all users in this set the amount α as they may have closer
other facility that they would rather contribute to. But our plan is to make the
users in the set Sp pay enough so that if we choose to open facility p we will be
able to recover a constant fraction of the cost.
The ghost process grows a ghost for every user. The ghost of user j is a ball
with j as its center that is growing uniformly to infinity. The radius of the ghost
at any time t ≥ 0 is equal to t. The ghost of a user j touches a facility p at time t if
c(j, p) ≤ t. All ghosts that touch a facility start filling the facility. The contribution
of the ghost j at time t towards filling facility p is κjp = max{0, t − c(j, p)}. A
facility p is declared full, if
∑
j∈S κjp ≥ fp. Let t(p) denote the time when p
becomes full. Let Sp be the set of users that contributed towards filling p, i.e. all
users that are at distance less than t(p) from p. Note that charging each user in
Sp the amount α = t(p) we would recover exactly the cost of opening facility p
and the cost of connecting all users in Sp to p, as fp =
∑
j∈Sp
(t(p) − c(j, p)), by
definition.
Cost shares
We raise the cost share αj of each user j at unit rate until j’s ghost touches some
full facility or some facility it is touching becomes full. More formally,
αj = min
p∈F
{max(t(p), c(j, p))} . (3.7)
Another way to think about this is that each facility p makes an offer to serve
j at cost α
(p)
j max(t(p), c(j, p)), and the client then chooses the facility that can
serve her at the lowest cost. Note that by adding more users, each facility can only
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get filled more quickly, and hence each individual user can only become satisfied
earlier. Hence
Lemma 3.12 The cost shares generated by the above process are cross-monotonic.
Deciding which facilities to open
We give two alternative rules for constructing the set of open facilities. Both rules
construct a feasible solution of cost bounded by thrice the sum of cost shares. The
first rule can be viewed as a restatement of the facility location algorithm due to
Mettu and Plaxton [70]. We give the second rule because it may look more natural
in this context; in Chapter 4 we shall prove that the the cost shares α are strict
with respect to this rule.
• Mettu-Plaxton Rule: For each facility, decide whether to open it or not
at the time it gets filled. Open the facility p if and only if at time t(p), there
is no already open facility q such that c(p, q) ≤ 2t(p). This way we avoid
opening many facilities crowded in one place.
• Modified Mettu-Plaxton Rule: The rationale behind this rule is that
we only want to open well-funded facilities, that is, facilities for which its
clients’ contributions are at least partially backed by the contributing clients’
cost shares. We define a facility p to be well-funded, if αj ≥ t(p)/3 for all
j ∈ Sp. Each time a facility p gets filled, the modified rule decides to open p
if (1) it is well funded, and (2) there is no already open facility q such that
c(p, q) ≤ 2t(p).
This simple fact holds regardless of which rule we use to open facilities.
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Claim 3.13 For any facility p, there is an opened facility q such that c(p, q) ≤
2t(p) (possibly p = q, if p is open).
Proof. If the original Mettu-Plaxton rule is used, the claim is immediate. For
the modified rule, consider a closed facility p. By a way of contradiction, suppose
the claim does not hold, and let p be the facility with minimum t(p) for which the
claim fails. The claim clearly holds for any p that is well-funded; thus consider
a facility p that is not well funded. For any such facility, there must be a client
j0 ∈ Sp such that αj < t(p)/3. Now, the reason why αj stopped growing must be a
facility q′ such that c(j, q′) ≤ αj and t(q′) ≤ αj. Since we picked p to be the facility
with minimal t(p) for which the claim does not hold and t(q′) ≤ αj < t(p)/3, the
claim must hold for q′. Hence there is an open facility q such that c(q, q′) ≤ 2t(q′).
But then, the triangle inequality gives us
c(p, q) ≤ c(p, q′) + c(q′, j) + c(j, p) ≤ 2t(q′) + αj + t(p) ≤ 2t(p)
.
Analysis
First we note that the cost shares αj give a feasible solution to the dual LP (3.1)
of cost
∑
j∈S αj. As this is a lower bound on the cost of any solution, it follows
that
∑
j∈S αj ≥ c(S).
Theorem 3.14 (Competitiveness) Every solution to the facility location prob-
lem has cost at least
∑
j∈S αj.
Next we will relate the amount of funds collected to the cost of the solution
constructed by the original or the modified Mettu-Plaxton rule. This not only
provides us with a proof that our cost shares are budget balanced, but also gives
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an alternate proof of the approximation guarantee of the algorithm of Mettu and
Plaxton.
Recall that for each facility p we defined the set Sp of clients “contributing
to” p. The following argument holds for either opening rule. Consider two open
facilities p and q, and let t(p) ≥ t(q). Since we decided to open p, it must be far
enough from q: c(p, q) ≥ 2t(p) ≥ t(p) + t(q), and hence
Fact 3.15 If facilities p and q are both open, then their contributor sets Sp and
Sq are disjoint.
This means that every user contributes towards filling of at most one open facility.
For the purposes of the analysis, we assign all users in the set Sp to the facility p,
for every open facility p. We assign each user that does not belong to the set Sp
of any open facility p to its closest open facility.
We claim that the users in the set Sp of every open facility p have paid enough
to cover 1/3 of the cost of p as well as 1/3 of their connection costs. By definition
of Sp, fp =
∑
j∈Sp
(t(p) − c(j, p)). After rearranging, we obtain that the opening
cost fp plus the connection cost
∑
j∈Sp
c(j, p) is equal to |Sp|t(p). To prove our
claim it suffices to show that the cost share of each user is at least t(p)/3.
Lemma 3.16 Let p be an open facility, and let j ∈ Sp be a user. Then 3αj ≥ t(p).
Proof. The lemma trivially holds if the modified Mettu-Plaxton rule is used.
For the original rule, consider a user j ∈ Sp. For contradiction, assume that
αj < t(p)/3. Let q be the first full facility that j touched, i.e. c(j, q) ≤ αj and
t(q) ≤ αj. If q is open, we get a contradiction, since c(p, q) ≤ t(p)+αj < 2t(p). If q
is not open, there is an open facility q′ such that c(q, q′) ≤ 2t(q) ≤ 2αj. See Figure
3.2. Again, we get a contradiction, because c(p, q ′) ≤ c(p, j) + c(j, q) + c(q, q′) ≤
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t(p) + αj + 2t(q) ≤ t(p) + 3αj < 2t(p). Note that p 6= q′, since t(q′) ≤ α < t(p).
j
p q q′
t(p) αj
2t(q)
Figure 3.2: If αj < t(p)/3, then c(p, q
′) < 2t(p).
Theorem 3.17 (Cost Recovery) The cost of the solution constructed by either
original or modified Mettu-Plaxton rule is at most 3
∑
j∈S αj, and hence the above
algorithm is a 3-approximate cross-monotonic cost sharing method for metric fa-
cility location.
Proof. Lemma 3.16 shows that the clients in the sets Sq pay for a 1/3rd of their
connection costs and the cost of the open facilities. Lemma 3.13 implies that for
every user that does not belong to any Sq, there is an open facility within distance
3αj.
3.2.5 Fault tolerant facility location
The Fault tolerant facility location problem generalizes regular facility
location by allowing clients to have connections to multiple facilities. In addition
to facilities and clients, an integer r ≥ 1 is given as a part of the input. The goal is
to open a subset of facilities, and connect each user to r distinct open facilities (the
rationale is that even if any r − 1facilities fail, each client will still be connected).
As usual, the cost of the solution is the sum of opening costs, plus the connection
costs cj,p for each client j and each of the r facilities p that j is connected to.
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The ghost process from Section 3.2.4 transfers almost without change to fault
tolerant facility location. Again, we will have a ghost for every user j that will
be just a ball centered at j with radius equal to the current time t. A ghost j
contributes κjp = max{0, t − c(j, p)} to each facility it touches, and the opening
time t(p) of facility p is the minimum time such that
∑
j∈S κjp ≥ fp.
In the non-fault-tolerant case, each client got to pick one facility p, and then
had to pay cost share equal to α
(p)
j = max(t(p), c(j, p)). In fault tolerant facility
location, each client wishes to have connections to r distinct facilities; we thus let
her choose the least costly set of r distinct facilities to contribute to. This gives
us the cost share
αj = min
{p1,p2,...,pr}⊆F
r∑
i=1
α
(pi)
j . (3.8)
Cross-monotonicity of such shares is easy to see: adding users can only decrease
α
(p)
j , and in turn, the cost share. We will not elaborate on competitiveness, but it
is not difficult to verify that αj form a feasible dual solution to the fault tolerant
facility location LP (see e.g. [41] for an LP formulation).
Opening facilities To decide which facilities to open, we again consider all
facilities in the order of increasing t(p). For each faciltity p, we decide to open it if
there are fewer than r already opened facilities within distance 2t(p) from p. We
assign each client to the r closest open facilities. Note that by construction, we
get the following equivalent of Fact 3.15.
Fact 3.18 No client is contributing to more than r open facilities.
41
Analysis Consider user j. Let p1, p2, . . . , pr be the r facilities that determine the
cost share of j. That is, p1, p2, . . . , pr are the r facilities with lowest α
(p)
j . Let us
assume they are ordered by increasing α
(pi)
j . According to Equation (3.8), the cost
share of j is αj =
∑r
i=1 α
(pi)
j .
On the other side of the equation, we take the k ≤ r facilities that user j
contributes to. If k < r, we complete the list by adding the closest r − k open
facilities that j did not contribute to. Let q1, q2, . . . , qr be the list of k open facilities
that j contributed to, plus r−k closest open facilities that were filled before j had
a chance to reach them, ordered by increasing α
(pi)
j . Note that the lists {pi}ri=1
and {qi}ri=1 may not be disjoint.
To bound the cost of our solution, it suffices to argue that each α
(pi)
j is sufficient
to pay for 1/3 of the cost of connecting j to qj plus 1/3 of the contribution offered
to qj by j. Hence, it suffices to argue that 3α
(pi)
j ≥ α(qi)j for i = 1 . . . , r.
For the sake of contradiction, let l be the first index such that 3α
(pl)
j < α
(ql)
j .
Note that this means, that immediately before time τ = α
(ql)
j , there were fewer
than l ≤ r open facilities within distance τ from j. Thus, this means that when
each of the facilities p1, p2, . . . , pl were considered, there were fewer than r open
facilities within distance τ − c(j, pi) ≥ τ −α(pi)j ≥ 2t(pi) from pi! Hence, according
to our opening rule, each of the facilities p1, p2, . . . , pl must have been declared
open. But this means that p1 = q1, p2 = q2,. . . , pl = ql, and hence α
(pl)
j = α
(ql)
j ,
contradicting our original assumption.
Theorem 3.19 (Cost recovery) Each user j can pay 1/3 of her contributions
to open facilities, plus 1/3 of her connection costs. Hence the cost shares αj recover
1/3 of the cost of our solution.
42
3.3 Single Source Rent-or-Buy
The Single Source Rent-or-Buy game is given by an undirected graph G =
(V,E) with costs ce on edges, a designated source vertex s, and a parameter M .
We are given a set S of users, each user j being located at some vertex v ∈ V (we
allow more users to be located at the same node). If no confusion arises, we use j
instead of its location v.
The goal is to build a network that connects each user to the source s by a
path. Each edge e in the network can either be bought at cost Mce, or rented at
cost ce. A bought link can support any number of paths, while on a rental link
we must pay the cost ce for each path that uses the edge. A network is feasible, if
it can support a path from each user j to the source s. The cost of the network
is the sum costs of all bought and rented edges. Let c∗(S) denote the cost of the
optimal network supporting the set of users S.
In this section we present our main result, a cost sharing method for the rent
or buy game.
Theorem 3.20 There is a cross-monotonic cost sharing method for the single
source rent or buy game that is competitive and recovers at least 1/15 of the cost
of a feasible network that can be constructed in polynomial time.
It is not hard to see that the bought edges in the optimum rent or buy network
form a Steiner tree with s at its root, and that the rental edges form a shortest path
connection from each user S to the closest point in the tree. Several approximation
algorithms [55, 39, 88] for this problem exploit the optimal structure to construct
a solution in two phases: first they use a facility location-like algorithm to gather
the users in a few center locations, and rent a path from each user to such a center.
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When enough demand is gathered at each center, a Steiner tree is built, connecting
all centers to the source.
It would be tempting to use our scheme for facility location to share the rental
costs, and use the cost sharing method of Jain and Vazirani [51] to share the cost
of buying the tree among the centers. Naturally, the contribution of each center
would be split among the users connected to it. However, the gathering algorithm
has to make decisions on where to choose the centers and how to assign users
to them. These decisions (necessarily influenced by the addition of new users)
may have arbitrary effects on what center a particular user is assigned to and the
number of other users it is sharing the center with, that could make the share of
an individual user heavily non-crossmonotonic.
We solve this problem by giving a process that avoids making decisions alto-
gether. As in the facility location case, we grow a ball around every user. Since
there is no opening cost, we open a center at any location p that has been reached
by M or more user balls. A regular primal-dual algorithm, such as [88] would
freeze all users that got connected to the open center, and stop growing their balls.
To ensure cross-monotonicity, we use the same trick as in the previous section:
continue growing a ghost ball around every user, even after the user gets connected.
Note that since the ghost balls keep contributing to opening new centers, much
more centers are opened than necessary. This poses a new problem: each user
may be connected to multiple centers, and the cost of building a Steiner tree on
all centers may be prohibitively large.
We deal with this problem in two different ways. When computing the cost
shares, we pretend that we are building a Steiner tree on all centers. We split the
cost of each center and try to charge it equally to all users connected to the center.
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Now, since a user may be connected to multiple centers, she gets to choose which
center to contribute to (we assume each user wants to contribute only to the center
where the required contribution is smallest).
Since most centers are not contributed to by enough users (or any users at
all), we can not hope that the user contributions would recover a constant fraction
of the cost of a Steiner tree on all centers. To build a tree that the cost shares
can pay for, we select only a subset of the centers, and assign each user to only
one center. Now we have forced the user to contribute only to the center he was
assigned to, but we still can only ask a contribution that is equal to the minimum
of her potential contributions to any possible center.
Technically, the hard part is to relate the two processes: one that pretends to
build a Steiner tree on all centers, used to compute the cost shares, and a standard
primal-dual process that we use to build a real tree on a subset of the centers, and
show that the cost shares grown by the first process pay for the solution constructed
by the second.
After a simplifying assumption, we describe the heart of the algorithm, which
is the ghost growing process. Then we describe how to generate the cost shares,
and how to find a feasible solution that can be partially paid for by the cost shares.
Finally, we show competitiveness by giving a lower bound on the cost of any feasible
solution.
A Simplifying Assumption. It will be convenient to think of each edge e as
a line segment of length ce, containing a continuum of points. We use the term
location to refer to both original vertices and intermediate points. We extend the
shortest path metric c to a metric on locations in the obvious way. For the rest of
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this section, we will assume that an edge segment can be bought or rented between
arbitrary pair of locations.
As shown in [88], a solution that is allowed to buy and rent edge segments
arbitrarily can be transformed into one that does not use intermediate points of no
greater cost. This is because any intermediate point p on edge e = (uv) that is an
endpoint of some paths can be shifted towards u or towards v without increasing
the cost. We move p until it merges with another intermediate endpoint or until
it reaches one of the ends of the edge. This way, we can remove all intermediate
endpoints one by one.
3.3.1 The ghost process
The ghost process we consider here is similar to the process considered in Section
3.2. Hence, each user j has a ghost, which is a ball B(j, t) with j as its center and
radius equal to the current time t.
The difference is that instead of thinking of the ghosts as contributing towards
opening a facility, we will be looking for locations that are potential gathering
points. Good candidates are locations that have been reached by M or more
ghosts. Let us denote the (time varying) set of all such locations by C. Note that
at any time, the set C can be represented as a collection of vertices, edges and
segments of edges.2
A connected component of C is any inclusion-maximal subset C of C such that
any two locations p1, p2 ∈ C are joined by a path (that is, a continuous curve)
lying completely within C.
2It is easy to see that each edge is subdivided into at most 2 min{M, |S|} + 1
segments, and hence this representation is of polynomial size.
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Let us take a closer look at the behavior of the set C in time. In the beginning,
C is empty, and there are no components. As time progresses, components begin to
appear. Each component starts as a single location p, that has been first reached
by some set S of users, |S| ≥ M . With increasing time, the set of locations
reachable by the users in S locally looks like a uniformly growing ball with center
p (note that the set
⋂
j∈S B(j, t) of locations reachable by all users in S may look
as a union of several balls, as the same set S may initiate multiple components
of C). As these balls grow, two or more of them may eventually touch, joining
into a single component. In general, pairs of components will be connecting up
and merging. Hence at any time, each component C of C can be expressed as
an union of uniformly growing balls of different radii, each of which started as an
independent component at a single location p.3 Note that since the ghosts grow
indefinitely, eventually the set C will consist of a single component.
We would like to point out a correspondence between the way the set C grows
and the standard primal-dual algorithm for Steiner tree (see [1], and also [38]), that
will be useful later. The algorithm maintains a list of components. Initially, each
terminal vertex is in a separate component. It grows a ball uniformly around every
vertex, and whenever the balls of two vertices touch, it builds the edge joining the
two vertices, merging the two components. The only difference is that while the
Steiner tree algorithm starts with a fixed set of components, in the ghost growing
process components may get created at arbitrary points in time. We will make
use of this connection in Section 3.3.4 to show that the cost shares can pay for a
constant fraction of the buying cost in a solution we construct.
3At most min{M, |S|} separate components can be created on any edge e, hence
the number of balls in the union is polynomial.
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3.3.2 Cost shares
To specify how the cost shares are computed, we need some definitions. We say
that a user j at time t is connected to a component C of C, if B(j, t)∪C 6= ∅. The
user is satisfied if it is connected to a component containing the source vertex s.
For each user j, let t(j) denote the time when the user first becomes connected to
a component and let t′(j) the time when j becomes satisfied.
Roughly speaking, we should make each user pay for the rental costs associated
with her. This suggests that we should charge each user amount proportional to
the time the user spent unconnected. Further, each user connected to a component
C should contribute an equal share to the cost of growing the component. If a user
is connected to multiple components, we let her contribute only to the component
where his share is smallest.
j
Figure 3.3: A client connected to multiple growing components.
For each component C of C, let S(C) denote the set of users connected to C.
For a connected user j, let aj(t) be the maximum size |S(C)| over all components
C that j is connected to at time t. Let us define a function fj for each user j
as follows: fj(t) = 1 for 0 ≤ t < t(j), fj(t) = M/aj(t) for t(j) ≤ t < t′(j), and
fj(t) = 0 for t > t
′(j). We define two versions of cost shares αj and α
′
j for each user
j. The final cost share, determined in Theorem 3.30, will be a weighted sum of the
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shares we now define, and balanced to optimize the fraction of the cost recovered.
αj =
∫ t′(j)
0
fj(t)dt and α
′
j =
∫ t(j)
0
fj(t)dt = t(j).
It is easy to establish the first of the three desired properties of our cost sharing
method.
Theorem 3.21 The cost shares α and α′ are cross-monotonic functions of the set
S.
Proof sketch. By adding more users, we can only make the set C larger, and
hence make each user connect earlier. Moreover, each component of C can only
increase by adding more users, as increases the number of users connected to that
component, hence the cost shares can only grow slower.
3.3.3 Building a solution
The goal of the following two sections is to prove that the cost shares α and α′ can
recover a constant fraction of the cost of a network supporting the given set S of
users. In this section, we give a way to construct such a feasible network, and in
the next section we use the similarity between the behavior of the set C and the
primal-dual Steiner tree algorithm to compare the cost of the solution constructed
with the cost shares.
Remember from the discussion in Section 3.3.1 that each new component of
the set C started out as a single point p. We will call such starting points centers.
For a location p, let t(p) denote the first time p appeared in the set C. Note that C
at a given time t is just a union of balls B(p, t− t(p)), with a ball of radius t− t(p)
around each center p.
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We want to use the centers as gathering points. However, to be able to pay
for the Steiner tree on the centers, we must select only a subset of the centers to
open, and assign each user to contribute to at most one open center. We do the
selection in a similar way we did for facility location.
For each center p we decide whether to open it at the time the center is created.
We declare p open, if at time t(p), there is no open center within radius 2t(p) of
p. As in the facility location case, this ensures that no user j can be in the
set Sp = {j ∈ S | c(j, p) ≤ t(p)} of users contributing towards creating p for two
distinct open centers p. The following result carries over from the previous section.
Lemma 3.22 Let p be an open center, and let j ∈ Sp. Then 3α′j ≥ t(p). For a user
j that does not belong to any Sp, there is an open center p such that c(j, p) ≤ 3α′j.
The network we construct is thus: we buy a Steiner tree that connects open
centers to the source s, and rent a path from each user to its closest open center.
Lemma 3.22 shows that the cost shares α′ can pay for 1/3 of the rental cost of the
network. The next section is devoted to showing that the shares α can pay for a
constant fraction of the tree we build.
3.3.4 Bounding the tree cost
For the purposes of analysis we assume that the primal-dual algorithm of Agrawal
et al. is used [1] (see also [38]) to build a Steiner tree on the open centers. The
algorithm starts with each center in a separate component. It grows a ball uni-
formly around every center. Every time two balls touch, a check is performed if
the centers of the balls are in the same component. If not, a shortest path between
the ball centers is bought, merging the two components into one. In addition, the
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center p of the first ball to reach the source vertex s is allowed to buy a shortest
path between p and s.
We can think of the algorithm as incurring cost of M per time unit for growing
each component that does not contain the root vertex s. (Growing the component
containing s is free.) That is, if a(t) denotes the number of non-root components
at time t, the total cost of growing the components is M
∫∞
0
a(t)dt, where the
integral is over the entire execution of the algorithm. By standard arguments, the
cost of the tree constructed is at most two times the growing cost.
For each Steiner component C ′ we define a (time varying) set Contrib(C ′) of
users that will be responsible for maintaining a steady flow of funding at least
M/3 per time unit from the time increments fj(t) of their cost shares. For an
open center p, let Sp(t) denote the set of users that are within distance t from p.
Note that Sp = Sp(t(p)). Let C
′ be a Steiner component at some given time t. We
define
Contrib(C ′) =
⋃
p∈C′
Sp(max{t, t(p)}).
We invite the reader to verify that no user contributes to more than one component
at any time. Indeed, if a user j contributes to two open centers p and q at some
time, by triangle inequality p and q are close enough to belong to the same Steiner
component. Hence
Lemma 3.23 At every time t, the contributor sets of two distinct Steiner compo-
nents C ′1, C
′
2 are disjoint.
Consider a user j that belongs to a contributor set of a Steiner component
C ′. In the ghost process, this user may be connected to several components of
C, and some of these components may have a large number of users connected
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to them. So even if the component C ′ is “small”, that is, does not have many
contributors, it may happen that most of its contributors all have a connection to
a large C-component, and hence their contributions fj(t) are not enough to support
the growth of the component C ′ at time t. However, what we will be able to say is
that later, namely at time 3t, the component C ′ will have grown large enough to
cover the area that the original “large” components occupied at time t and connect
to all users that were connected to the “large” components at time t. These users
together are able to pay enough for the growth of C ′ at time 3t with their growth
rates fj(t) at time t.
Lemma 3.24 Let j be a user such that at time t, j ∈ Contrib(C ′) for some Steiner
component C ′. Then fj(t/3) ≥M/|Contrib(C ′)|.
Before proving 3.24, let us state a useful fact that essentially carries over from
the facility location secition.
Fact 3.25 For location p ∈ C, there is an opened center q (possibly q = p) such
that c(p, q) ≤ 2t(p).
Lemma 3.26 Suppose at time t, users i and j are connected to the same compo-
nent C of the set C. Then at time 3t, i and j belong to the contributor set of the
same Steiner component C ′.
Proof. Let i and j be connected to a component C of C at some time t. Note
that C is a union of balls around (opened or unopened) centers. User i is connected
to C, hence there must be a center q with a ball B(q, t − t(q) that intersects the
ghost of i. Similarly there is a center q′ and a ball B(q′, t− t(q′)) intersecting the
ghost of j. Since the centers q and q′ belong to the same component, there must
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be a sequence of centers q1 = q, q2, . . . , qk = q
′, with balls B` = B(q`, t− t(q`)) such
that the balls of every two consecutive centers intesect.
By Fact 3.25, there is a sequence of (not necessarily distinct) open centers
p1, . . . , pk, such that for every `, c(p`, q`) ≤ 2t(q`). See Figure 3.4 for an example.
It is easy to verify that the distance c(i, p1) ≤ 2t(q1) + t ≤ 3t, and analogously
c(pk, j) ≤ 3t. The distance c(p`, p`+1) can be bounded by 4t as
c(p`, p`+1) ≤ c(p`, q`) + c(q`, q`+1) + c(q`+1, p`+1) ≤
≤ 2t(q`) + (t− t(q`)) + (t− t(q`+1)) + 2t(q`+1) ≤ 4t.
Hence each pair of consecutive balls B(p`, 3t) must intersect, proving that p1
and pk are in the same Steiner component at time 3t. By definition of Contrib,
both i and j must be in the contributor set of this Steiner component.
q1
q2
q3
q4
p1
p2
p3 p4
i
j
≤ t
≤ t
t− t(q3)
≤ 2t(q1)
Figure 3.4: Clients i and j connected to a component C at time t.
Proof of Lemma 3.24. Note that since |Sp| ≥ M for any open center p,
|Contrib(C ′)| is always at least M , and hence M/|Contrib(C ′)| ≤ 1. If j is not
connected at time t/3, then fj(t/3) = 1 and the inequality trivially holds.
If j is connected at time t/3, fj(t/3) = M/|S(C)| for some component C of C.
By Lemma 3.26, Contrib(C ′) at time t contains all users that were contributing to
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C at time t/3.
Using Lemma 3.24, we can bound the cost of the tree built.
Lemma 3.27 The cost of the tree we buy is at most 6
∑
j αj.
Proof. At any time t, the users are able to collect Ma(t) revenue from their
contributions at time t/3. Hence
∫ ∞
0
Ma(t)dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
∑
j
fj(t/3)dt = 3
∑
j∈S
αj.
Since M
∫∞
0
a(t)dt can pay for a half of the tree, the buying costs of our solution
does not exceed 6
∑
j αj.
3.3.5 Cost Recovery and Competitiveness
Theorem 3.28 (Cost recovery) The cost of the solution constructed is at most∑
j(3α
′
j + 6αj).
Proof. Lemma 3.27 bounds the buying cost by 6
∑
j αj, while by Lemma 3.22,
the rental costs can be bounded by 3
∑
j α
′
j.
Theorem 3.29 (Competitiveness) Every feasible solution to the single source
rent or buy instance has cost at least max
(
1
2
∑
j∈S αj,
∑
j∈S α
′
j
)
.
One way to prove Theorem 3.29 is to write down an IP formulation of the single
source rent or buy problem and give feasible dual solutions of cost
∑
j αj/2 and∑
j α
′
j respectively. In fact, the vectors α/2 and α
′ can be completed to a feasible
solution of the dual given by [88]. We sketch a direct proof of this theorem, which
we believe is more intuitive.
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Proof of Theorem 3.29. Consider an arbitrary solution SOL to the Single
Source Rent-or-Buy instance. We will show that its cost must be greater or equal
to 1
2
∑
j∈S αj. (the proof for
∑
j∈S α
′
j is simpler and is omitted).
Suppose we came up with a set of lengths dj,e of edges for each user j with the
following properties:
1. For every edge e and every user j, dj,e ≤ ce.
2. For every edge e,
∑
j∈S dje ≤ 2Mce.
3. The shortest path from every user j to the source s in the metric dj has
length at least αj.
Again, consider an arbitrary solution SOL. Since every user must have a path
to s, we have
αj ≤
∑
e bought
dj,e +
∑
e rented for j
dj,e.
Summing the above inequalities over all j ∈ S we obtain
∑
j
αj ≤
∑
e bought
∑
j
dj,e +
∑
j
∑
e rented for j
dj,e.
We can write the cost of the solution as
cost(SOL) =
∑
e bought
Mce +
∑
j
∑
e rented for j
ce.
From properties (1) and (2) we obtain that
∑
e bought
∑
j
dj,e ≤ 2
∑
e bought
Mce
∑
j
∑
e rented for j
dj,e ≤
∑
j
∑
e rented for j
ce.
Combining these inequalities we obtain
∑
j αj ≤ 2 cost(SOL).
It remains to show that such dj,e exist. For a user j, let Sj(t) be the set of
locations reachable by j. A location p is reachable by j, if it lies inside j’s ghost
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(i.e. c(j, p) ≤ t), or it lies in a component that j is connected to. An edge e is
crossed by the set Sj, if it has one endpoint inside s and one outside. We start
with all dj,e = 0. At every time t, we increase the length dj,e of each edge e that is
crossed by Sj at rate fj(t).
Since at every time point we increase the length of all edges in some j-s cut
at rate fj(t), the length of the shortest j-s path in the dj metric will be equal
to
∫∞
0
fj(t)dt = αj. The boundary of each Sj moves at speed greater or equal
to 1 (it may jump when components merge), hence no edge can accumulate dj,e
that is greater than its original length ce. Finally, consider property (2). Each
edge e can be crossed by two types of boundaries, corresponding to ghosts of users
and ghosts of components. Each location on e can be crossed by at most M user
ghosts, contributing at most one unit of length per unit of time each, and at most
one component ghost, contributing M units of length per unit of time. Hence,∑
j dj,e ≤Mce +Mce = 2Mce.
Combining Lemma 3.21, Theorem 3.28 and Theorem 3.29 we obtain
Theorem 3.30 The cost shares ξ(S, j) = 1/5α′j + 2/5αj are cross-monotonic,
competitive and recover 1/15 fraction of the cost of the solution constructed.
3.4 Recent developments
There has been a lot of recent interest in cross-monotonic cost sharing methods
among researchers. Let us mention some papers, most of them are in preparation
or being submitted for publication.
Immorlica, Mahdian and Mirrokni [50] have developed an elegant technique for
proving lower bounds on cost recovery, based on selecting a random “counterex-
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ample” subinstance of a problem from an instance with high symmetry. Using this
technique they prove, among other things, that the 3-budget balanced cost sharing
method for facility location from Section 3.2 is indeed optimal, and no α-budget
balanced cross monotonic cost sharing exists for α < 3. They also show that there
is no o(n)-balanced cost sharing for the set cover problem, and no o( 3
√
n)-balanced
cost sharing function for vertex cover.
Leonardi and Scha¨fer [68] derive a constant-budget balanced cross-monotonic
cost sharing function for the connected facility location problem by generalizing our
rent-or-buy algorithm from Section 3.3, while Xu [91] obtains a 6-budget-balanced
cross-monotonic cost sharing for the multilevel facility location problem using the
ghost technique.
Finally, Ko¨nemann et al. [63] recently obtained 2-budget-balanced cost shar-
ing for the Steiner Network problem, resolving an open question whether Steiner
network admits a constant-budget balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing.
Chapter 4
Approximation via Cost Sharing
In this chapter we explore an interesting and promising application of cost sharing
to the design and analysis of approximation algorithms. We introduce the notion
of strict cost sharing methods and show how they lead to simple yet powerful
algorithms for a number of combinatorial optimization problems.
The first ideas leading to the technique of boosted sampling appear in a paper
by Gupta, Kumar and Roughgarden [44]. Gupta, Kumar, Pa´l and Roughgarden
[43] introduced the notion of strict cost shares in the context of an approximation
algorithm for the Multicommodity Rent or Buy problem (which is the subject of
Chapter 5). This chapter is based on a paper by Gupta, Pa´l, Ravi and Sinha [45],
who generalized the notion of strictness, formally introduced the boosted sampling
technique and used it to design approximation algorithms for stochastic versions
of a number of classical NP-hard optimization problems.
4.1 Introduction
Infrastructure planning problems involve making decisions under uncertainty about
future requirements; while more effective decisions can be made after the actual
set of clients have materialized, the decision-making costs are inflated if deferred
until then. The following simple two-stage model captures this tradeoff effectively.
Future requirements are uncertain, but are assumed to be drawn from a known
probability distribution (e.g., from demand forecasts, industry outlooks). In light
of this information, an anticipatory part of the solution may be constructed in a
first-stage at the current costs. Subsequently, the requirements facing the plan-
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ner materialize in the form of a client set (drawn from the distribution), and the
first-stage solution must be augmented to satisfy the revealed requirements. The
elements chosen in this second stage are costlier than when chosen earlier, re-
flecting the need for careful (first-stage) planning. Given the uncertainty of the
requirements, the traditional minimum-cost goal may be adapted to minimize the
total expected cost of the solution.
As an example, consider the Stochastic Steiner tree problem that speci-
fies an inflation parameter σ and a probability distribution pi on the set of terminal
nodes (which are clients) that have to be connected to the root in a given rooted
discrete metric space. A subset of edges E0 may be bought by paying the original
lengths in the first stage. Once the actual set of terminals S is revealed, we must
then buy the recourse edges ES at σ times their lengths so that S is connected to
the root by edges in E0 ∪ ES. The objective is to minimize c(E0) + E[σ c(ES)].
Here the expectation is over pi, the randomness in the set of terminals revealed.
The framework is that of two-stage stochastic optimization with recourse [61, 60,
84] which may be paraphrased as “On Monday, we only know the input distribution
on the clients, and we can buy some resources. On Tuesday, the client set is now
completely specified, but things are now more expensive (in our case, by a factor
σ); we must buy any additional resources needed to get a feasible solution to the
instance.”
Following this framework, in Stochastic Vertex Cover, the clients are
edges to be covered, and we are given a probability distribution over sets of edges
that will arrive; vertices become σ times more expensive after these edges are
revealed. The Stochastic Facility Location problem on a metric space con-
taining clients and facilities with opening costs defines a probability distribution
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over the set of clients that will require connection to open facilities. Opening fa-
cilities becomes σ times costlier in the second stage. The objective, in addition to
expected cost of opening facilities, also includes expected connection costs of the
revealed clients to their closest open facilities.
Our Results. In this paper, we give a simple yet general framework to translate
approximation algorithms for deterministic optimization problems1 into approxi-
mation algorithms for corresponding stochastic versions with second-stage inflation
parameter σ. Given an α-approximation algorithm for the classical problem, one
can use it in the following framework:
1. Boosted Sampling: Sample σ times from the distribution pi to get sets of
clients D1, . . . , Dσ.
2. Building First Stage Solution: Build an α-approximate solution for the clients
D = ∪iDi.
3. Building Recourse: When actual future in the form of a set S of clients
appears (with probability pi(S)), augment the solution of Step 2 to a feasible
solution for S.
Note that we do not need to know the distribution pi explicitly; it could be a
black-box from which we can draw samples. (In practice, these samples could be
drawn from market predictions, or from Monte-Carlo simulations.) Thus we can
sidestep the often-lethal problem of handling an exponential number of scenarios.
Informal Main Result 1.1 If the α-approximation algorithm A satisfies some
technical properties (the problem is sub-additive, and A admits a β-strict cost-
1While the approximation algorithm solves the deterministic counterpart of the
problem as opposed to the stochastic one, there is no requirement for this algorithm
itself to be deterministic, e.g., randomized approximation algorithms can just as
well be used in our framework.
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sharing function2), then the above framework yields an α + β approximation for
the stochastic version of the problem.
The framework is laid out in Section 4.2 and the formal result is Theorem 4.4.
Using this framework, we show that stochastic variants of Steiner Tree, Fa-
cility Location, and Vertex Cover have constant-factor approximation al-
gorithms; the details are in Sections 4.4-4.5.
We also consider the special case of independent decisions; in this, each client j
has a probability pij of arrival independent of other clients, and the probability pi(S)
of the set S materializing is given by
∏
j∈S pij
∏
j /∈S(1 − pij). For this model, we
can also give a 8-approximation for the stochastic version of the Steiner Forest
problem and improve the approximation ratios of the corresponding versions of
Vertex Cover and Facility location to 3 and 6 respectively.
While a natural approach to utilizing an approximation algorithm for a deter-
ministic problem is to set the client requirements at their expected value according
to pi, we note that this approach cannot yield bounded approximation ratios even
in simple examples. Rather, using the full power of sampling in building the first
stage solution gives a provably good solution as we demonstrate.
Related Work. The study of stochastic optimization [20, 54] dates back to the
work of Dantzig [27] and Beale [17] in 1955; these papers defined the notions of
stochastic linear programming. Stochastic LPs have been very widely studied since,
and several gradient-based and decomposition-based approaches are known for two-
stage versions of stochastic linear programming. On the other hand, only moderate
progress has been reported for stochastic integer (and mixed-integer) programming
in both theoretical and computational domains; see [84, 61] for details.
2These terms will soon be defined, in Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
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While stochastic scheduling problems have been studied extensively in the lit-
erature [78], the papers often try to identify cases where some standard scheduling
policies yield optimal results, or the results hold for some special distributions (e.g.,
where job sizes are exponentially distributed), or focus on problems for which the
deterministic versions are polynomial-time solvable. There are, of course, excep-
tions; see, e.g., [62, 36, 73, 87].
Very recently, there has been a surge of interest in stochastic versions of NP-
hard problems. Dye et al. [29] demonstrate that while deterministic version of a
problem called single resource service-provision admits a FPTAS, allowing stochas-
tic demands makes it strongly NP-hard. They also give an approximation algo-
rithm for the stochastic problem. Ravi and Sinha [81], and independently, by
Immorlica et al. [49] look at versions of our model with some restrictions on the
distribution pi, while we consider arbitrary distributions pi. In particular, they
consider the following cases.
• the scenario model, where the distribution pi has its support on a family
F of possible subsets explicitly given as part of the input (and hence the
algorithms are allowed to take time poly(|F|, n)), and
• the independent decisions model, where each element j has an associated
probability pij, and the probability of a set pi(S) =
∏
j∈S pij
∏
j /∈S(1 − pij).
(I.e., the sets are chosen by flipping a coin independently for each element.)
Since our algorithms in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 work for arbitrary distributions,
our theorems hold in both the above models as well. In particular, our 3.55-
and 3-approximations for stochastic Steiner Tree and Vertex Cover in the
independent model improve upon the O(logn)- and 6.3-approximations in [49]
respectively.
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One can define (as in [81]) other stochastic variants of the problems we define
here: e.g., one can imagine that there are multiple inflation parameters, and that
instead of all things getting dearer by σ, different parts of the problem change in
different ways. This work leaves open the question of whether our framework can
be extended to handle such multiple-parameter stochastic problems.
Stochastic Steiner Tree appears similar to the maybecast problem of Karger and
Minkoff [55]; however, the latter is a single-stage optimization problem. Finally,
though some of our techniques, including strict cost-shares come from the work
of [44, 43], the problems considered there are deterministic optimization problems.
4.2 Model and Notation
We define an abstract combinatorial optimization problem that we will adapt to
a stochastic setting. To define Π, a combinatorial optimization problem, let U be
the universe of clients (or requirements), and let X be the set of elements that
we can purchase. For any F ⊆ X, let c(F ) denote the cost of the element set F .
Given a set of clients S ⊆ U , let Sols(S) ⊆ 2X be the set of feasible solutions for
the client set S. The deterministic version Det(Π) specifies a fixed subset of clients
S ⊆ U , and the objective is to return F ∈ Sols(S) with least cost. We denote by
OPT(S) a solution in Sols(S) of minimum cost.
Definition 4.1 We require all our problems Π to satisfy sub-additivity. This prop-
erty states that if S and S ′ are two sets of clients with solutions F ∈ Sols(S) and
F ′ ∈ Sols(S ′), then we must have that (i) S ∪ S ′ is a legal set of clients for Π, and
(ii) F ∪ F ′ ∈ Sols(S ∪ S ′).
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For example, the Steiner Tree problem on a graph G = (V,E); the clients
U = V are the set of vertices, and the elements X are edges E of the graph.
To ensure sub-additivity, we require a root vertex r. The cost of a set of edges
F ⊆ X is c(F ) = ∑e∈F ce. Given a set S ⊆ V of terminals, the solutions are
Sols(S) = {T |T connects all vertices of S ∪ {r}}.
Given any problem Π, we can define a variant adapted from the framework of
two-stage stochastic programming with recourse as follows.
• There will be two stages of purchasing. Let σ ≥ 1 be a given inflation
parameter; every element x ∈ X costs cx in the first stage but costs σ cx in
the second.
• In the first stage, the algorithm is only given access to an oracle that can
draw from the probability distribution pi : 2U → [0, 1] in time poly(|U |). It
can then construct a first-stage solution by buying a set of elements F0 at
cost c(F0).
• In the second stage, one set S ⊆ U of clients is realized according to the
distribution pi; i.e., the probability that S is realized is pi(S). We assume
that this set S is conditionally independent of any of our actions in the first
stage. Now the second-stage solution (also called the recourse) consists of
a set of elements FS purchased at the inflated cost σ c(FS). The union of
the sets F0 ∪ FS must lie in Sols(S), i.e., the first and second stage solutions
taken together give a feasible solution for the realized set of clients.
The objective of an algorithm for the stochastic problem Stoc(Π) is to select a
set F0, and then, given a set S from the distribution pi, to select FS to minimize
the expected cost of the solution:
c(F0) +
∑
S⊆U pi(S)σc(FS). (4.1)
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Hence the stochastic version of the Steiner Tree problem allows us to purchase
some edges F0 in the first stage, and once the set of realized clients S ⊆ V is
revealed, to buy some more edges FS so that F0 ∪ FS contains a tree spanning S.
4.2.1 Cost sharing functions
We now define the cost-shares that are used crucially to bound the performance of
our approximation algorithms. Loosely, a cost-sharing function is one that divides
the cost of a solution F ∈ Sols(S) among the client set S. Cost-sharing functions
have long been used in the context of game-theory [51, 53, 75, 77, 92]. We will use
(a slight variant of) a cost-sharing function defined recently by Gupta et al. [43]: in
contrast to previous cost-sharing mechanisms, this cost-sharing function is defined
relative to a fixed (approximation) algorithm for the problem Π.
Definition 4.2 Given an α-approximation algorithm A for the problem Π, the
function ξ : 2U × U → R≥0 is a β-strict cost-sharing function if the following
properties hold:
P1. For a set S ⊆ U , ξ(S, j) > 0 only for j ∈ S.
P2. For a set S ⊆ U , ∑j∈S ξ(S, j) ≤ c(OPT(S)). (fairness)
P3. If S ′ = S ] T , then ∑j∈T ξ(S ′, j) ≥ (1/β)× cost of augmenting the solution
A(S) to a solution in Sols(S ′). (strictness)
Formally, there must exist a polynomial time algorithm AugA which can
augment A(S) to a solution in Sols(S ′) at cost at most β∑j∈T ξ(S ′, j).
Define the function ξ(S,A) as the sum
∑
j∈A ξ(S, j).
Remark 4.3 Note that one possible algorithm AugA is obtained by just zeroing
out the costs of elements already picked in A(S), and running A again. In all cases
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we consider, there are natural algorithms A for which this AugA ensures strictness;
however, in this paper, we choose algorithms A and AugA that complement each
other and give better approximation ratios.
4.3 Approximation via Cost Sharing
In this section, we give a general technique for converting an approximation al-
gorithm A for a deterministic problem Det(Π) into an approximation algorithm
for the stochastic version Stoc(Π), provided the problem Π satisfies sub-additivity,
and there is a cost-sharing function ξ that is strict w.r.t. A.
4.3.1 Algorithm: Boosted Sampling
Given an instance of a stochastic problem Stoc(Π), the goal of the first stage is
to buy the elements that will be useful for the unknown client set realized in the
second stage. Since our algorithm is not clairvoyant and hence cannot see the
future, the next best thing it can do is to sample from the distribution pi, and use
the samples as an indication of what the future holds. This simple idea is the basis
of our method.
A na¨ıve attempt would be to sample once from the distribution and use the set
obtained as our prediction for the future: however, this is not aggressive enough
in that it ignores the fact that the future is more expensive by a factor of σ. In
fact, as σ → ∞, the optimal solution would be to assume that every client in U
will be realized and must be accounted for in the first stage itself. Motivated by
these concerns, the algorithm for the problem Stoc(Π) is stated below, in terms
of the α-approximation algorithm A for Π, which comes equipped with a β-strict
cost-sharing function (and hence an associated augmentation algorithm AugA).
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Our algorithm requires a number of samples that is linear in σ. Indeed, if
all we have is a sampling access to the distribution pi, it is not hard to see that
Ω(σ) samples are needed. In many practical situations, this may not be a concern,
unless the value of σ is exorbitant. In some cases (e.g., see Section 4.6), addi-
tional information about the distribution pi can be used to make the running time
independent of σ. Let bσc denote σ rounded down to the nearest integer.
Algorithm Boost-and-Sample(Π)
1. Draw bσc independent samples D1, D2, . . . , Dbσc of the realized clients by
sampling from the distribution pi. Let D = ∪iDi.
2. Using the algorithm A, construct an α-approximate first-stage solution F0 ∈
Sols(D).
3. If the client set S is realized in the second stage, use the augmenting algorithm
AugA from (P3) to compute FS such that F0 ∪ FS ∈ Sols(S).
The following theorem is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 4.4 Consider a combinatorial optimization problem Π that is sub-ad-
ditive, and let A be an α-approximation algorithm for its deterministic version
Det(Π) that admits a β-strict cost sharing function. Then Boost-and-Sample(Π) is
an (α + β)-approximation algorithm for Stoc(Π).
We will prove Theorem 4.4 in the rest of the section. In the next section, we
illustrate an application of this theorem to obtain an approximation algorithm
for the Stochastic Steiner Tree. In subsequent sections, we go on to con-
sider several other problems, and show that their approximation algorithms and
attendant cost sharing functions provide approximation algorithms for the corre-
sponding stochastic versions.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4: To simplify the notation, we shall assume that σ
is an integer, i.e. σ = bσc. It is straightforward to verify that the proof can be
carried out for arbitrary real value of σ.
We will bound the expected costs of our first and second-stage solutions sepa-
rately. Let F ∗0 be the first-stage component of the optimal solution, and F
∗
S be the
second-stage component if the set of realized clients is S. Hence
the optimal cost Z∗ = c(F ∗0 ) +
∑
S pi(S) σ c(F
∗
S). (4.2)
Let us denote Z∗0 = c(F
∗
0 ) and Z
∗
r =
∑
S pi(S) σ c(F
∗
S).
First stage: We claim that there is an element F̂1 ∈ Sols(D) such that
E[c(F̂1)] ≤ Z∗. Indeed, define F̂1 = F ∗0 ∪ F ∗D1 ∪ F ∗D2 ∪ . . . ∪ F ∗Dσ . The fact that
F̂1 ∈ Sols(D) follows from sub-additivity of the problem Π. Therefore,
ED[c(F̂1)] ≤ c(F ∗0 ) + ED[
∑σ
i=1 c(F
∗
Di
)]
= c(F ∗0 ) +
∑σ
i=1 EDi[c(F
∗
Di
)]
= c(F ∗0 ) + σ
∑
S pi(S) c(F
∗
S) = Z
∗,
the penultimate equality following from the fact that each of the Di’s are chosen
from the probability distribution pi. Since we have an α-approximation algorithm
for Det(Π), our solution F0 satisfies E[c(F0)] ≤ αc(F̂1), which in turn is at most
αZ∗, bounding our first stage costs.
Second stage: Let S be the set of realized clients, and let FS be the result of
our algorithm AugA such that F0 ∪ FS ∈ Sols(S). We need to bound our expected
second stage cost, which is σE[c(FS)]. The β-strictness of the cost sharing function
ξ implies that c(FS) ≤ β ξ(D∪S, S). In fact, we even have c(FS) ≤ β ξ(D∪S, S\D).
Consider the following alternate probabilistic process to generate the sets Di
and the set S: Draw σ + 1 independent samples D̂1, D̂2, . . . , D̂σ+1 from the distri-
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bution pi. Now choose a random value K uniformly from {1, 2, . . . , σ+ 1}, and set
S = D̂K and D = ∪i6=KD̂i. This process is identically distributed to the original
process, since we are picking the sets independently. Let D̂ be the union of all the
D̂i’s, and let D̂−i be the union ∪l 6=iD̂l of all the sets except D̂i.
Since the cost sharing function is fair (Property P2), we have
∑σ+1
i=1 ξ(D̂, D̂i \ D̂−i) ≤ c(OPT(D̂)).
By our random choice of K, we get
EK[ξ(D̂, D̂K \ D̂−K)] ≤ 1σ+1c(OPT(D̂))
Since the alternate process is probabilistically identical to the one we used to pick
D and S,
ED,S[ξ(D ∪ S, S \D)] = ED̂,K[ξ(D̂, D̂K \ D̂−K)]
≤ 1
σ+1
E
D̂
[c(OPT(D̂))] (4.3)
To complete the argument, we now show that E
D̂
[c(OPT(D̂))] ≤ σ+1
σ
Z∗. To
derive a feasible solution to D̂, define F̂2 = F
∗
0 ∪ F ∗D̂1 ∪ F
∗
D̂2
∪ . . . ∪ F ∗
D̂σ+1
. Again,
the fact that F̂2 ∈ Sols(D̂) follows from sub-additivity of Π. Thus we have
E
D̂
[c(OPT(D̂))] ≤ c(F ∗0 ) +
∑σ+1
i=1 ED̂i[c(F
∗
D̂i
)]
≤ Z∗0 + (σ + 1) Z
∗
r
σ
≤ σ+1
σ
(Z∗0 + Z
∗
r ) =
σ+1
σ
Z∗. (4.4)
Thus ES[c(FS)] ≤ β ED,S[ξ(D ∪ S, S \ D)], which using (4.3) and (4.4), is
bounded by β
σ
Z∗. Finally, since our second stage cost is σ c(FS), our expected
second stage cost is ES[σ c(FS)] ≤ β Z∗.
Putting together the first and second stage costs gives the bound claimed in
the theorem.
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4.4 Stochastic Steiner Trees
In the classical deterministic Steiner Tree problem, we are given a set of vertices
V , and the costs ce on edges satisfy the triangle inequality. (This assumption is
without loss of generality, since we can take the metric completion of the graph.)
We assume there is a designated root vertex r. Given a set of terminals (i.e., the
clients), the goal is to buy a set of edges (the elements) of minimum cost so that
the terminals and the root r lie in a connected component. Note that the presence
of the root ensures that the problem is sub-additive.
Now let us consider the problem Stoc(Steiner Tree): in the first stage, we
can buy some edges F0 at cost
∑
e∈F0
ce. In the second stage, a set of terminals
S ⊆ V is realized with probability pi(S), after which we may buy some more edges
to connect the terminals to the root; however, these edges must be bought at cost
σ ce each.
Theorem 4.5 There exists a 2-approximate algorithm A for Steiner Tree,
along with a cost sharing function ξ that is 2-strict for A.
Proof. The algorithm A is simply Prim’s algorithm [79] for minimum spanning
tree; given a set of terminals S, it ignores the vertices not in S ∪ {r}, and builds
an MST on S ∪ {r}. It is well-known that the cost c(A(S)) of any MST is within
a factor of 2 of the cost of the optimal Steiner tree OPT(S).
Given an MST A(S) on the set of terminals S, let us imagine it to be rooted at
r; for j ∈ S, set ξ(S, j) to be half the cost of the edge connecting j to its parent in
A(S), which we call j’s parental edge in A(S). Clearly, if j /∈ S, then ξ(S, j) = 0.
By definition,
∑
j∈S ξ(S, j) =
1
2
c(A(S)); since the MST is a 2-approximation to
the Steiner tree problem, this implies that 1
2
c(A(S)) ≤ c(OPT(S)), and hence ξ is
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fair.
Finally, to prove the 2-strictness, consider a set S ′ = S ] T . The augmenting
procedure AugA basically zeroes out the edges of A(S) and runs Prim’s algorithm;
i.e., it takes the solution A(S), and for each j ∈ T , adds the parental edge of j
in A(S ∪ T ). We claim this gives a solution in Sols(S ∪ T ). (Indeed, each vertex
j ∈ T whose parent in A(S ∪ T ) was in S ∪ {r} will now be connected to A(S),
and hence to r; the general argument follows by a simple induction.) Since these
edges cost 2×∑j∈T ξ(S ∪ T, j), we have proved the theorem.
Note that the argument for strictness only required that each vertex in the
solution A(S) was connected to the root, and hence the same cost shares are also
2-strict for any heuristic for Steiner Tree. Now, using the 1.55-approximation for
Steiner Tree [82] and Theorem 4.4, we obtain the following improved theorem:
Theorem 4.6 There is a 1.55-approximation algorithm for Steiner Tree, along
with a cost-sharing function ξ that is 2-strict for it. Hence, there is a 3.55-
approximation algorithm for Stoc(Steiner Tree).
This improves on the O(logn)-approximation for the independent decisions
version of Stoc(Steiner Tree) given by Immorlica et al. [49].
4.5 Other Applications
This section will be devoted to looking at several other (deterministic) problems
Π; for each problem, we will give an α-approximation algorithm A and its accom-
panying β-strict cost-share function.
71
4.5.1 Facility Location
An instance of Facility Location is given by a set of facilities F and a set of
clients S. The distances cij between any pair of points i, j from F ∪ S form a
metric. Each facility p has opening cost fp; the goal is to open a subset of facilities
F ′ to minimize the opening costs plus the sum of distances from each client to its
closest open facility: ∑
p∈F ′ fp +
∑
j∈S c(j, F
′).
The main result for Stoc(Facility Location) is the following:
Theorem 4.7 The cost sharing function ξ given by Pa´l and Tardos is 5.45-strict
for the 3-approximation algorithm of Mettu and Plaxton. Hence, there is a 8.45-
approximation algorithm for
Stoc(Facility Location).
Proof. Let us briefly review the algorithm of Mettu and Plaxton [70], and the
cost sharing defined by Pa´l and Tardos [77]. Let S be a set of clients. For a facility
p, let B(p, τ) be a ball with center p and radius τ . We define the opening time
tp(S) of a facility p w.r.t. the set of clients S to be the unique radius τ such that
fp =
∑
j∈B(p,τ)∩S (τ − c(j, p)). (4.5)
Let the set Cp(S) = {j ∈ S | c(j, p) < tp(S)} be called the contributing set for p.
Note that if we charge each client in Cp the amount tp(S), we exactly recover the
facility cost of p plus the cost of assigning clients in Cp to p. We drop the set of
clients from the notation, and say tp instead of tp(S) when there is no danger of
confusion. The cost shares of clients are then defined as
ξ(S, j) = min
p∈F
{ max(tp(S), c(j, p)) }. (4.6)
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Intuitively, the contribution of user j towards the facility p should be either tp if
j ∈ Cp, or the connection cost c(j, p) if j /∈ Cp. The client can (and does) choose
to contribute only to the least demanding facility; the facility p for which this
minimum is attained is called the primary facility of j (in the run on S). A facility
p is said to be well-funded if ξ(S, j) ≥ tp(S)/3 for all j ∈ Cp.
The algorithm A we use is a slight modification of the algorithm of Mettu
and Plaxton; given a set of clients S, A considers all the well-funded facilities p
in order of increasing opening time tp(S). For each such (well-funded) facility p,
the algorithm declares it open if there are no previously opened facilities within a
radius 2 tp(S) around p.
For each open facility p, A assigns all clients in Cp to p. (By construction, the
sets Cp for open facilities p are disjoint.) It then assigns each client not lying in
any Cp to its closest open facility. The following facts can be derived from the
arguments in [70] and [77]:
1. For each open facility p, the cost shares ξ(S,Cp) of the clients in Cp pay 1/3
of fp plus their assignment cost. (See [77, Lemma 2.4] and the preceding
discussion therein.)
2. For each facility p, there exists a well-funded facility q (possibly p = q) such
that c(p, q) ≤ 2 (tp − tq). (Note that it must be that tq ≤ tp.)
3. For each facility p, there exists an open facility q within a distance of 2tp.
Hence, if p is a primary facility for some client j, then c(j, q) ≤ 3ξ(S, j).
To show strictness of ξ, we must specify the algorithm AugA which augments
a solution A(S) to cover a set of new clients T with S ∩ T = ∅. In the following,
let Cp = Cp(S ∪ T ) denote the contributor set of a facility p in the run A(S ∪ T ).
Similarly, when we say a facility p is well-funded, we mean that p is well-funded
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in the run A(S ∪ T ). A facility p is called T -heavy if |Cp ∩ T | ≥ b|Cp| (where the
parameter b ∈ (0, 1) will be specified later), and is T -light otherwise. Note that a
T -light facility must have |Cp ∩ S| ≥ (1− b)|Cp|.
Claim 4.8 If p is a T -light facility, then
tp(S) ≤ 11−b tp(S ∪ T ) − 1|Cp∩S|
∑
j∈Cp∩T
c(j, p).
Proof. Consider the set Cp = {j ∈ S ∪ T | c(j, p) < tp}; by the definition (4.5),
fp +
∑
j∈Cp
c(j, p) = |Cp| tp(S ∪ T )
Since p is T -light, |Cp ∩ S| ≥ (1− b) |Cp|.
fp +
∑
j∈Cp∩S
c(j, p) = |Cp| tp(S ∪ T )−
∑
j∈Cp∩T
c(j, p)
≤ |Cp ∩ S| tp(S ∪ T )
1− b −
∑
j∈Cp∩T
c(j, p).
which means facility p was already paid for at time
tp(S ∪ T )/(1− b)−
∑
j∈Cp∩T
c(j, p)/(|Cp ∩ S|)
in the run A(S), proving the claim.
Augmentation procedure AugA: To augment A(S) to cover T as well, we
pick a subset of well-funded T -heavy facilities to open greedily in a manner very
similar to that in A(S ∪ T ): we consider all well-funded T -heavy facilities in order
of increasing tp(S ∪ T ), and open a facility p if there is no facility q already open
within a radius 2 tp(S∪T ) of p. (Note that q may have been opened in either A(S),
or in the augmenting phase before p was considered.) We never open any T -light
or non-well-funded facilities. At the end of this procedure, for a client j ∈ Cp
whose p is open, we assign j to p; else we assign j to the closest open facility.
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Claim 4.9 The augmentation cost for a set T is at most
(3 +
√
6)
∑
j∈T ξ(S ∪ T, j).
Proof. Firstly, consider any well-funded T -heavy facility p. Since p is T -heavy,
the shares of clients in Cp∩T can pay for a b/3 fraction of the facility cost plus their
own connection costs. Hence we must consider clients j whose primary facility p
is either not well-funded or not T -heavy. We claim that in both cases there must
be a facility close to p opened either by A(S), or in the augmenting phase. Note
that by the properties of the algorithm A, there is a well-funded facility q such
that tq(S ∪ T ) ≤ tp(S ∪ T ) and c(p, q) ≤ 2 (tp(S ∪ T )− tq(S ∪ T )).
Now, if q is T -heavy, by the properties of our augmentation procedure, there
must a facility r that was open in the augmentation step such that c(q, r) ≤
2 tq(S∪T ). On the other hand, if q is T -light, we have that tq(S) ≤ tq(S∪T )/(1−b)
by Claim 4.8 above. Thus, in the run A(S), there must be an open facility r such
that c(q, r) ≤ 2 tq(S) ≤ (2/(1− b)) tq(S ∪ T ).
In both cases, the assignment cost of the client j is bounded by
c(j, r) ≤ c(j, p) + c(p, q) + c(q, r)
≤ c(j, p) + 2(tp(S ∪ T )− tq(S ∪ T )) + 2
1− b tq(S ∪ T )
≤ c(j, p) + 2
1− b tp(S ∪ T )
≤ (1 + 2
1− b) ξ(S ∪ T, j).
To balance 3/b and (1 + 2/(1− b)), we can now pick b = 3−√6 to get the desired
result.
Since β = 3 +
√
6 ≤ 5.45, this proves the theorem.
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4.5.2 Vertex Cover
In the Vertex Cover problem, we are given a graph G = (V,E) with costs cv on
vertices. The clients are the edges, and our goal is to choose a subset V ′ of the
vertices so that each edge is covered ; i.e., at least one of its adjacent vertices is
chosen. In the stochastic version, we pay cv for picking a vertex v in the first phase,
and σ cv for picking it in the second phase. We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.10 There is a 8-approximation algorithm for Stoc(Vertex Cover).
Before we do this, let us define a version of the problem called Relaxed Stochastic
Vertex Cover. In the relaxed version of the stochastic problem, we are allowed to
make payments to a vertex in both stages, with p1(v) and p2(v) being payments
made to v in the first and second stage respectively. A vertex v is chosen if and
only if p1(v) + p2(v)/σ ≥ cv. Again, given a set of realized edges S, the set of
chosen vertices must form a feasible vertex cover for S. The cost of our solution
is just the sum of payments, i.e.
∑
v∈V p
1(v) + p2(v), and the goal is again to
minimize the expected cost.
Note that by requiring that p1(v) ∈ {0, cv} and p2(v) ∈ {0, σcv}, we get back
to our usual stochastic framework, and hence the relaxed problem allows us to
make partial commitments to vertices in the first stage. However, it turns out that
we can convert any algorithm A for the relaxed problem into an algorithm A′ for
the unrelaxed version with the same expected cost. Indeed, if p1(v) is the amount
of money placed on vertex v by A in the first stage, the algorithm A′ picks the
vertex v in its first stage with probability min{1, p1(v)/cv}. In the second stage,
A′ selects the vertex v if v was selected by A (that is, p1v + p2v/σ ≥ cv), and if
A′ has not already selected it in the first stage. By linearity of expectations, the
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expected cost incurred by A′ in each phase is at most the cost incurred by A in
that phase. Thus it suffices to give an algorithm and a cost sharing function for
relaxed vertex cover.
The Algorithm A: We use a standard primal-dual 2-approximation algorithm
A for vertex cover. Let S ⊆ E be the set of edges in the instance. For each
edge e, we have a dual variable ye, initially set to 0. We simultaneously raise
all dual variables at a uniform rate. A vertex v becomes tight when the duals
of edges adjacent to it can pay its cost, i.e. when
∑
e∈δ(v) ye = cv. When a
vertex v becomes tight, we freeze all edges adjacent to it, i.e., we stop raising
their dual variables. We continue raising the dual variables of all unfrozen
edges, until all edges become frozen.
Output: The algorithm places payments p(v) =
∑
e∈δv
ye on each vertex
v ∈ V . Since each edge is adjacent to some tight vertex v, it has been paid
cv and hence bought outright; thus the solution is feasible for S.
The Cost Shares: Define ξ(S, e) = ye; since each edge pays both its endpoints,
it holds that
∑
v∈V p(v) = 2
∑
e∈S ye. Furthermore,
∑
e ξ(S, e) is just the LP
dual value, and hence at most OPT(S).
Clearly, the algorithm A is a 2-approximation for the vertex cover problem. To
prove Theorem 4.10, it suffices to prove the strictness of ξ for A.
Theorem 4.11 The cost shares ξ defined above are 6-strict with respect to the
algorithm A.
Proof. Let S and T be two disjoint sets of edges. To augment the solution
A(S) to handle T as well, the augmenting algorithm AugA looks at the (relaxed)
payment function p : V → R≥0 for the set of edges S, and runs the algorithm A
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on the set of edges T with the reduced costs c′v = cv − p(v). To prove strictness,
we need to compare this augmentation cost to the cost share ξ(S ∪ T, T ). To this
end, we shall compare several runs of A on different related inputs.
• Run R1: This is the run of A with original costs cv on the set S ∪ T . Let
y1e be the duals produced. Let us define payments p
1
S(v) =
∑
e∈δ(v)∩S ye and
p1T (v) =
∑
e∈δ(v)∩T ye respectively.
Note that p1 = p1S∪T = p
1
S +p
1
T is exactly the payment function computed by
A. Furthermore, this is the run that computes the cost-shares ξ(S ∪ T, T ).
• Runs RS and RT : The run RS is the run of A on the set of edges S, but
with costs cS = c− p1T (i.e., reduced by the payments of T in R1). Similarly
the run RT is on the edges T , with reduced costs c
T = c− p1S.
• Run R2: This is A’s run on the edge set S, with original costs c, and hence
corresponds to the actual run of the first stage. Let y2 be the duals and p2
the payments computed.
• Run R3: This is on the edge set T , with reduced costs c3 = c − p2; hence,
this corresponds to the augmentation step for T . Again, y3 and p3 are the
duals and the payments.
By the definition of RS, the freezing time of all edges e ∈ S in the two runs RS
and R1 is the same; hence the dual y
S is just the dual y1 restricted to the set S,
and p1S = p
S. Similarly, the dual yT from the run RT is identical to the dual y1
restricted to T , and p1T = p
T . We claim that, to prove the theorem, it suffices to
prove the following claim:
Claim 4.12
∑
v∈V p
3(v) ≤ 3 ∑v∈V p1T (v).
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Before we prove this claim, let us see how it proves Theorem 4.11. Note that
cost of the augmentation run R3 is exactly
∑
v p
3(v), while the cost shares
ξ(S ] T, T ) =
∑
e∈T
ye =
1
2
∑
v∈V
p1T (v).
Hence ξ(S ∪ T, T ) can defray at least one-sixth of the cost of the run R3, proving
the theorem.
Proof of Claim 4.12: The proof relies on the following Lipschitz-type
property of the algorithm A: imagine the vertex costs to be vectors in R|V |, and
suppose the costs change by an amount  (in their L1-distance), then we claim
that the payments do not change by more than 2 . Formally,
Claim 4.13 (Lipschitz continuity) Consider two runs R and R̂ of A with the
same edge set S on two different cost vectors c and ĉ, and let p and p̂ be the two
vectors of payments computed. If we define ∆ so that (p− p̂) = (c− ĉ) + ∆, then
‖∆‖1 ≤ ‖c− ĉ‖1.
The proof of the Lipschitz condition follows below; but let us use it to complete
this proof. First, we use it to compare the runs RS and R2 (both being defined on
the edge set S): define ∆1 so that
p2 − p1S = c− (c− p1T ) + ∆1 = p1T + ∆1; (4.7)
then Claim 4.13 implies that ‖∆1‖1 ≤ ‖p1T‖1. The second application of Claim 4.13
is to the runs R3 and RT (both on the edge set T ); it implies that if ∆2 is such
that
p3 − p1T = (c− p2)− (c− p1S) + ∆2 = p1S − p2 + ∆2, (4.8)
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then ‖∆2‖1 ≤ ‖p1S − p2‖1; this, by (4.7), is at most ‖p1T‖1 + ‖∆1‖1 ≤ 2‖p1T‖1.
Furthermore, plugging (4.7) into (4.8), we get
p3 − p1T = −(p1T + ∆1) + ∆2.
Simplifying, this gives ‖p3‖1 = ‖∆1‖1 + ‖∆2‖1 ≤ 3‖p1T‖1.
Proof of Claim 4.13: Consider the two runs R and R̂ of A on the two cost
vectors c and ĉ being executed in parallel. Let pt(v) and p̂t(v) be the payments
towards vertex v accumulated in the respective runs until time t. We claim that
the quantity Φ(t) =
∑
v∈V |(c(v) − pt(v)) − (ĉ(v) − p̂t(v))| never increases as a
function of t. Since Φ(0) = ‖c− ĉ‖1 and Φ(∞) = ‖(p− p̂)− (c− ĉ)‖1 = ‖∆‖1, this
will prove Claim 4.13.
Consider any edge e = {u, v} at time t in both runs. If e is not frozen in either
run, it causes both p(u) and p̂(u) to increase at unit rate; the same arguments hold
for v. Since u is not tight in either run, c(u)− pt(u) > 0 and ĉ(u)− p̂t(u) > 0, and
edge e contributes to both terms equally; hence it is currently contributing at rate
zero to the difference (c(u)− pt(u))− (ĉ(u)− p̂t(u)). If e is frozen in both runs, its
current rate of contribution is zero as well.
Now suppose that e is frozen in only one of the runs; say, it is frozen in the
run R but not in the run R̂ (the other case is symmetric). That means one of
its endpoints must be tight in R; w.l.o.g., assume the tight vertex is u. Thus
c(u)−pt(u) = 0. In the run R̂, the contribution of e makes the term ĉ(u)− p̂t(u) =
|(c(u) − pt(u)) − (ĉ(u) − p̂t(u))| decrease at unit rate. However, its contribution
towards v, and hence towards the term |c(v)− pt(v)− (ĉ(v)− p̂t(v))| increases at
a rate of at most 1 in the worst case. Hence, the quantity Φ never increases.
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4.6 Independent Decisions
The independent decisions model was defined in Section 1 as the model when each
client j ∈ U has a probability pij of requiring service independently of all other
clients. For this special case of our model, we show that a weaker version of strict
cost-shares is sufficient to obtain algorithms for stochastic problems. This allows us
to obtain approximations for some more problems (e.g., for Steiner Network),
and obtain stronger results for others (e.g., for Vertex Cover and Facility
Location) in the independent decisions model.
Given a problem Π, we use Ind(Π) to denote the stochastic extension of Π
in this independent decisions model. For this section, we will need the following
weaker definition of strictness that holds only for additions of a single client.
Definition 4.14 Given an α-approximation algorithm A for the problem Π, the
function ξ : 2U × U → R≥0 is a β-uni-strict cost-sharing function if proper-
ties (P1), (P2) hold in conjunction with:
P3′. If S ′ = S ]{j}, then ξ(S ′, j) ≥ (1/β)× cost of augmenting the solution A(S)
to a solution in Sols(S ′). (uni-strictness)
Again, we need a poly-time algorithm AugA that does the augmentation with
cost at most β ξ(S ′, j).
4.6.1 The (Even Simpler) Algorithm Ind-Boost
Let us define the (yet simpler) algorithm for the independent case:
Algorithm Ind-Boost(Π)
1. Choose a set D by picking each element j ∈ U with probability σ pij inde-
pendently.
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2. Using the algorithm A, construct an α-approximate solution F0 ∈ Sols(D).
3. Let S be the set of clients realized in the second stage. For each client
j ∈ S, use the augmentation algorithm AugA of (P3′) to compute Fj such
that F0 ∪ Fj ∈ Sols(D ∪ {j}). Output FS =
⋃
j∈S Fj as the second stage
solution. Note that by subadditivity, F0 ∪ FS ∈ Sols(S).
Note that Ind-Boost(Π) can be implemented in polynomial time regardless of
how large σ is. Here is a version of the main Theorem 4.4 for the independent
decisions model. This version assumes only the weaker property of uni-strictness,
hence it is useful when fully strict cost sharing is not known, or when uni-strictness
leads to better approximation guarantees.
Theorem 4.15 Consider a deterministic combinatorial optimization problem Π
that is sub-additive, and let A be an α-approximation algorithm for Π with a β-
uni-strict cost sharing function. Then Ind-Boost(Π) is an (α + β)-approximation
algorithm for Ind(Π).
Proof. While it is possible to prove this result closely following the lines of that
for Theorem 4.3.1, we give a slightly different proof here.
First, some notation: let pi(S) =
∏
j∈S pij
∏
j 6∈S(1 − pij). Let F ∗0 be the first-
stage component of the optimal solution, and F ∗S be the second-stage component
if the set of realized clients is S, and let Z∗ be defined as in Equation (4.2).
First stage: Again, we claim that there is F̂1 ∈ Sols(D) such that E[c(F̂1)] ≤ Z∗;
the actual proof is by a slightly different “coupling” argument. As a thought exper-
iment, throw elements of D into σ sets D1, . . . , Dσ independently and uniformly
at random. Now, since D was picked by sampling U at rate σ pij, each Di is
distributed as though we sampled element j ∈ U with probability pij. (The con-
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tents of different Di’s are correlated negatively, but we will only use linearity of
expectations.)
Define F̂1 = F
∗
0 ∪F ∗D1∪F ∗D2∪. . .∪F ∗Dσ . Again, F̂1 ∈ Sols(D) from sub-additivity,
and
ED[c(F̂1)] ≤ c(F ∗0 ) + ED[
σ∑
i=1
c(F ∗Di)]
= c(F ∗0 ) +
σ∑
i=1
EDi [c(F
∗
Di
)]
= c(F ∗0 ) + σ
∑
S
pi(S) c(F ∗S) = Z
∗.
Now an α-approximation algorithm for Det(Π) gives us a solution F0 with expected
cost E[c(F0)] ≤ αc(F̂1) ≤ αZ∗, bounding our first stage costs.
Second stage: Let S be the set of realized clients, and let FS =
⋃
j∈S Fj be the
result of our algorithm AugA. Note that for all j ∈ S, F0 ∪ Fj ∈ Sols({j}), thus
by subadditivity F0 ∪ FS ∈ Sols(S). We need to bound our expected second stage
cost, which is σE[c(FS)], which we will bound by the expected first stage cost.
Define φj for an element j ∈ U to be the random variable φj = ξ(D, j), and ψj
to be the cost of augmenting a solution for D to include j as well, in the case that
j ∈ S. (Hence, ψj = c(Fj) if j ∈ S and ψj = 0 if j /∈ S.) Let Xj = σψj − β φj.
Now let us condition on all the first-stage coin-tosses T in U except for j’s toss.
Let DT be all the vertices picked according to T (which does not include j), and
consider the expected value of Xj over the first-stage toss for j, and the tosses of
the realized set S.
ED,S[σ ψj| T ] = σ × pij × (1− σ pij) c(Fj) and (4.9)
ED[β φj| T ] = β × σ × pij × ξ(DT ] {j}, j). (4.10)
By uni-strictness of A, (4.10) is at least (4.9), and hence ED,S[Xj| T ] ≤ 0. Since
83
this holds for all T , ED,S[Xj] ≤ 0 unconditionally, and thus
ED,S[ψj] ≤ β
σ
ED[φj]. (4.11)
Note that Properties (P1) and (P2) of the cost shares ξ imply that
∑
j∈U
ED[φj] =
∑
j∈U
ED[ξ(D, j)] = ED[
∑
j∈D
ξ(D, j)]
≤ ED[c(OPT (D))] ≤ Z∗. (4.12)
Furthermore, ED,S[FS] ≤
∑
j ED,S[ψj] follows by sub-additivity; using this, (4.11)
and (4.12), we get that expected second-stage cost σE[c(FS)] ≤ β Z∗, proving the
result.
4.6.2 Steiner forest
The Steiner forest problem is a generalization of the Steiner tree problem, and is
defined over an edge-weighted graph. A client u is now a pair (si, ti) of vertices,
and given a set of clients S, a feasible solution consists of a set of edges F such
that for each (si, ti) ∈ S, there is a path from si to ti in F . The problem is easily
verified to be sub-additive.
In Chapter 5, we will give a (2+
√
2)-approximation algorithm for this problem,
that admits a (2 +
√
2)-strict cost sharing function. We note that there are algo-
rithms for the Steiner Forest problem with approximation guarantee of 2 [1, 38],
but they do not admit a uni-strict cost sharing function. We believe that the
techniques of Chapter 5 can lead to fully strict cost-sharing for Steiner Network,
although we are still lacking a proof at this moment.
Theorem 4.16 There is a (4+
√
8 < 6.83-approximation algorithm for Ind(Steiner
Forest).
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4.6.3 Unrooted Steiner Tree
The Unrooted Steiner Tree problem is, given a set S of users, to build a min-
imum cost Steiner tree spanning these users. In contrast to the regular Steiner
Tree problem, here the tree does not have to include the root vertex. Note that
while deterministic Steiner tree and Unrooted Steiner tree are equivalent
problems, this is no longer the case with stochastic versions of these problems.
In particular, Stochastic Steiner Tree is not sub-additive (Def. 4.1).
Indeed, the input consisting of a single user {i}, the solution consisting of an empty
set of edges is feasible, and the same holds for the single user {j}. However, the
union of these two empty solutions is not feasible for the union of the inputs (any
solution for the input {i, j} must contain an i-j path, and hence be non-empty).
It turns out, however, that stochastic Steiner tree is a special case of a gener-
alized version of stochastic Steiner forest. Although we are not able to construct
a fully strict cost sharing for Steiner forest, we can take advantage of the fact
that the second stage solution for Steiner tree is connected. In Section 5.5 we give
cost sharing for Steiner forest that is strict with respect to this special type of
augmentations.
Theorem 4.17 There is a 4+
√
8-approximation algorithm for Ind(Group Steiner
Tree).
4.6.4 Facility Location
Improved results may be obtained for other problems which have already been
studied in Section 4.5.
Theorem 4.18 There is a 3-approximation algorithm A for the facility location
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problem, along with cost-shares ξ that are 3-uni-strict w.r.t. A. Hence, there is a
6-approximation for Ind(Facility Location).
Proof. The proof closely follows that of Theorem 4.7, which the reader is urged
to peruse. Here, we will be concerned with the special case of the singleton set
T = {j}.
Consider the run A(S ∪ {j}), and let p be the primary facility of j in this run.
Here is the augmentation procedure AugA: if p is open in the run A(S), it simply
assigns j to p. If p is closed, it has two options: if p is {j}-heavy, it opens p and
assigns j to it. Otherwise, it assigns j to the closest facility opened in A(S).
We claim that the augmentation cost is at most 3ξ(S ∪ {j}, j). Indeed, if
we decide to open j’s primary facility p, ξ(S ∪ {j}, j) can pay for a b-fraction
of the facility cost of p plus assignment cost of j. If not, Claim 4.8 implies that
tp(S) ≤ tp(S ∪ {j}) |Cp||Cp∩S| −
c(j,p)
|Cp∩S|
. We know that there is an open facility r within
distance 2 tp(S) from p, and so reroute j to r. The connection cost in this case is
at most
c(j, p) + 2
(
tp(S ∪ {j}) |Cp||Cp ∩ S| −
c(j, p)
|Cp ∩ S|
)
which is at most 3 max(c(j, p), tp(S ∪ {j})) = 3 ξ(S ∪ {j}, j). Since we need to
minimize max{1/b, 3}, the best value is b = 1/3, finishing the proof.
4.6.5 Vertex Cover
We present the following improvement on the 6.3-approximation given for Ind(Ver-
tex Cover) given by Immorlica et al. [49]. As discussed in Section 4.5.2, to
obtain an approximation algorithm for Stoc(Vertex Cover), it is enough to
consider the relaxed version of the problem, where we are allowed to make arbitrary
payments p1 and p2 to vertices in the two stages, with the vertex v being bought if
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p1(v) + p2(v)/σ ≥ cv. As mentioned there, results for this relaxed problem can be
easily transferred back to obtain an algorithm in the standard model: this is done
by choosing a vertex with probability p1(v)/cv in the first stage, and then picking
it in the second stage if p1(v) + p2(v)/σ ≥ cv and it was not already picked.
Theorem 4.19 There is a 2-approximation algorithm A for the relaxed Vertex
Cover problem, and cost-shares ξ that are 1-strict with respect to A, giving us a
3-approximation for Ind(Vertex Cover).
Proof. The algorithm A, as well as the cost shares ξ, are the same as in
Section 4.5.2. To augment a solution A(S) on the addition of the edge e = {u, v},
the augmentation procedure AugA opens the endpoint whose reduced cost is less.
I.e., if the payments in A(S) are denoted by p, we pay δ = min(cu − p(u), cv −
p(v)) to the vertex from {u, v} that achieves this minimum and open it. Proving
strictness is now equivalent to proving that δ ≤ ξ(S ∪ {e}, e).
Indeed, consider the runs A(S) and A(S ∪ {e}). Both runs behave identically
till some endpoint of e, say u, goes tight in the latter run. At that point, the
payment made by other edges to u in A(S ∪ {e}) is exactly cu − ξ(S ∪ {e}, e).
Since the two runs were identical till now, u has received this payment in A(S) as
well, and hence p(u) ≥ cu − ξ(S ∪ {e}, e). Hence, ξ(S ∪ {e}, e) ≥ cu − p(u) ≥ δ,
proving the theorem.
4.7 Recent developments
Some interesting papers appeared recently on the topic of two-stage stochastic
optimization. Gupta, Ravi and Sinha [46] develop LP-rounding techniques for
stochastic Steiner tree and related problems. Shmoys and Swamy [86]show that
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linear programming relaxations of a broad class of stochastic problems, although
exponential in size, can be solved within a desired precision using the machinery
of the ellipsoid method, and show how to round this solution for problems such as
set cover or facility location.
Flaxman, Frieze and Krivelevich [32] derive asymptotic formulas on the cost
of a two-stage stochastic minimum spanning tree under the assumption that all
edge costs are drawn uniformly at random from the unit interval. They show that
any algorithm for the stochastic problem has to do strictly worse in expectation
than an omniscient algorithm that can see the second stage costs before making
decisions in the first stage. They also show that the expected cost of a natural
simple heuristic for the stochastic problem, is within 17% of the optimal cost.
Gupta, Srinivasan and Tardos [47] observe that the boosted sampling scheme
preserves cross-monotonicity: if the cost sharing functio ξ is cross-monotonic, the
expected cost share of each user will be cross-monotonic as well. In general, it
is not clear how to compute these expectations; however, at some expense in
approximation guarantee, [47] have been able to derandomize the computation in
case of Steiner trees, obtaining a cross-monotonic cost sharing function with better
budget balance than in Section 3.3.
Chapter 5
Multicommodity Rent-or-Buy
Most of this chapter has appeared in a paper Approximation via cost sharing: A
simple approximation algorithm for the multicommodity rent or buy problem by
Gupta, Kumar, Pa´l and Roughgarden [43]. Improvements in the analysis of the
Multicommodity Rent or Buy algorithm are due to Becchetti, Ko¨nemann, Leonardi
and Pa´l [18].
5.1 Introduction
We study the multicommodity rent-or-buy (MRoB) problem, a network design
problem with economy of scale. In this problem, we are given an undirected
graph G = (V,E) with non-negative weights ce on the edges e and a set D =
{(s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk)} of vertex pairs called demand pairs. We seek a minimum-cost
way of installing sufficient capacity on the edges E so that a prescribed amount
of flow can be sent simultaneously from each source si to the corresponding sink
ti. The cost of installing capacity on an edge is given by a simple concave func-
tion: capacity can be rented, with cost incurred on a per-unit of capacity basis, or
bought, which allows unlimited use after payment of a large fixed cost. Precisely,
there are positive parameters µ and M , with the cost of renting capacity equal to
µ times the capacity required (per unit length), and the cost of buying capacity
equal to M (per unit length). By scaling, there is no loss of generality in assuming
that µ = 1.
The MRoB problem is a simple model of network design with economies of
scale, and is a central special case of the more general buy-at-bulk network design
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problem, where the cost of installing capacity can be described by an arbitrary
concave function. In addition, the MRoB problem naturally arises as a subroutine
in multicommodity versions of the connected facility location problem and the
maybecast problem of Karger and Minkoff [55]; see [65] for further details on these
applications.
The MRoB problem is easily seen to be NP- and MAX SNP-hard (for example,
it contains the Steiner tree problem as a special case [19]), and researchers have
therefore sought approximation algorithms for the problem.1 For many years, the
best known performance guarantee for MRoB was the O(logn)-approximation algo-
rithm due to Awerbuch and Azar [8] and Bartal [14] (n = |V | denotes the number
of nodes in the network). The first constant-factor approximation algorithm for
the problem was recently given by Kumar et al. [65]. However, both the analysis
and the primal-dual algorithm of [65] are quite complicated, and the performance
guarantee shown for the algorithm is, while constant, extremely large.2 The prob-
lem of obtaining an algorithm with constant performance guarantee for MRoB
while using only a transparent algorithm and/or obtaining a reasonable constant
has since remained open.
In this chapter we will show that the deterministic rent-or-buy problem can be
modeled as a special case of the corresponding two stage stochastic buy-only prob-
lem that we studied in Chapter 4. In our case, the deterministic buy-only problem
is the Steiner network problem: given a graph G with non-negative weights and a
1Recall a c-approximation algorithm for a minimization problem runs in poly-
nomial time and returns a solution no more than c times as costly as an optimal
solution. The value c is the approximation ratio or performance guarantee of the
algorithm.
2While this constant was neither optimized nor estimated in [65], the approach
of that paper only seems suitable to proving a performance guarantee of at least
several hundred.
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set of users (demand pairs) S = ((s1, t1), (s2, t2), . . . , (sk, tk)), find a minimum-cost
subgraph F ⊆ G such that every demand pair is connected in F .
The boosted sampling approach has been first used by Gupta et al. [44] to
obtain an algorithm for a rent-or-buy type problem; however, without the cost
sharing machinery of Chapter 4 they were only obtain an algorithm for the single-
sink version of the problem.
5.1.1 Our Results
The main technical result of this chapter is obtaining a (2 +
√
2)-uni-strict cost
sharing function for the Steiner network problem, together with an attending 2 +
√
2-approximation algorithm for the problem. Plugging this into the framework of
Chapter 4, we get an algorithm for stochastic Steiner network for a restricted class
of distributions. Finally, we obtain an algorithm for the multicommodity rent-or-
buy problem by modelling it as a special case of the stochastic Steiner network
problem.
A key ingredient for our result is a simple but novel extension of the primal-dual
algorithms of Agrawal et al. [1] and Goemans and Williamson [38] for the Steiner
forest problem.
Our performance guarantee of 4+
√
8 ≤ 6.83 is probably not the best achievable
for the MRoB problem, but it identifies rent-or-buy as one of the more tractable
problems with economy of scale. Recently, Andrews [2] has shown that the mul-
ticommodity buy-at-bulk network design problem, where the cost of installing
capacity on edges is an arbitrary concave function is hard to approximate within a
factor better than O((logn)1/4). By restricting ourselves to a special case, constant
factor approximability can usually be recovered. The single-sink buy-at-bulk prob-
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lem, which requires all commodities to share a single sink can be approximated
within 73 [44]. Keeping the single-sink assumption and placing further restrictions
on the function describing the cost of capacity yields the Access Network Design
problem of Andrews and Zhang [3], for which the best known approximation ratio
is 68 [72]. The single-sink special case of MRoB is approximable within 3.55 [44]).
5.1.2 Related Work
The only previous constant-factor approximation algorithm for the MRoB problem
is due to Kumar et al. [65]. Additional papers that considered multicommodity net-
work design with economies of scale are Awerbuch and Azar [8] and Bartal [14], who
gave an O(logn)-approximation to the more general multicommodity buy-at-bulk
problem. The special case of MRoB where all commodities share the same sink,
and the closely related connected facility location problem, have been extensively
studied [42, 44, 55, 58, 59, 66, 67, 80, 88]. The randomized 3.55-approximation
algorithm of Gupta et al. [44] is the best known approximation algorithm for the
problem. Swamy and Kumar [88] achieve a performance guarantee of 4.55 with a
deterministic algorithm. Several more general problems that retain the single-sink
assumption have also been intensively studied in recent years, including the Access
Network Design problem [3, 39, 40, 72], the single-sink buy-at-bulk network design
problem [34, 40, 44, 83, 89], and the still more general problems where the capac-
ity cost function can be edge-dependent [25, 71] or unknown to the algorithm [35].
The best known approximation ratios for these four problems are 68 [72], 73 [44],
O(logn) [25, 71], and O(logn) [35], respectively.
Finally, our high-level algorithm of randomly reducing the MRoB problem to
the Steiner forest problem, followed by computing shortest paths, is similar to and
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partially inspired by previous work that gave online algorithms with polylogarith-
mic competitive ratios for many rent-or-buy-type problems [9, 13, 15, 16].
5.2 Rent-or-Buy as stochastic Steiner forest
By a Steiner forest for (G,D), we mean a subgraph F ofG so that, for each demand
pair (s, t) ∈ D, there is an s-t path in F . For such a subgraph F , c(F ) = ∑e∈F ce
denotes its overall cost. Since we are only interested in solutions with small cost
and edge costs are non-negative, we can always assume that F is a forest.
Consider the stochastic version Stoc(Steiner forest) defined in Chapter 4.
Consider a simple distribution pi:
pi(S) =
1
|D| if S = {(si, ti)} (5.1)
pi(S) = 0 if |S| 6= 1
That is, with probability 1, exactly one demand pair appears, and each demand
pair is equally likely.
We claim that an instance of stochastic Steiner forest with second-stage infla-
tion ratio σ is equivalent to an instance of multicommodity rent-or-buy problem
with M = n/σ. Indeed, edges built by the first stage stochastic solution corre-
spond to the edges bought by the solution to the rent-or-buy problem, and edges
installed in the second stage in scenario where {(si, ti)} is the materialized demand
correspond to the edges rented by the (si, ti) demand pair. It is easy to check that
the costs of these two solutions are proportional: each edge bought costs ce and
Mce for stochastic Steiner forest and multicommodity rent-or-buy respectively; a
rented edge costs σce with probability 1/n (that is, σ/nce = 1/Mce in expectation)
and ce respectively.
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Hence, we can solve MRoB by running the boosted sampling algorithm with
the distribution pi. To claim an approximation ratio using Theorem 4.4, we need to
exhibit an approximation algorithm with an attending strict cost sharing function.
Although we believe that a natural cost sharing function is strict with respect to
our algorithm, we have only been able to prove uni-strictness. Fortunately, it turns
out uni-strictness is all we need: since the distribution pi never allows more than
one user materialize at a time, we only need to care about single demand-pair
augmentations.
Theorem 5.1 The boosted sampling framework turns any α-approximation algo-
rithm for Steiner forest that admits a β-uni-strict cost sharing function into an
(α + β)-approximation algorithm for the multicommodity rent or buy problem.
5.2.1 Some Definitions
In the following text, it will be crucial for us to compare executions of algorithms
and cost shares on inputs with varying sets of clients, but also on different un-
derlying graphs. To accomodate this need, we specify the graph in question with
an additional parameter to the cost sharing function. We use ξ(G,D, (s, t)) to de-
note the cost share of a demand pair (s, t), assuming that the edge costs are given
by the graph G, and that the set D of demand pairs is being served (we assume
(s, t) ∈ D).
Let dG(·, ·) denote the shortest-path distance in G (w.r.t. edge costs in G).
Given a subset E ′ ⊆ E of edges, G/E ′ is the graph obtained from G by contracting
the edges in E ′. Note that the cheapest way of connecting vertices s and t by
renting edges, given that edges E ′ have already been bought, is precisely dG/E′(s, t).
Using this notation, we restate the uni-stricntess property as follows.
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Definition 5.2 Let A be a deterministic algorithm that, given instance (G,D),
computes a Steiner forest. A cost-sharing method is β-uni-strict for A if for all (G,
D) and (s, t) ∈ D, the cost ξ(G,D, (s, t)) assigned to (s, t) by ξ is at least a 1/β
fraction of dG/F (s, t), where F is the Steiner forest returned for (G,D\{(s, t)}) by
algorithm A.3
It is not clear a priori that strict cost-sharing methods with small β exist:
Definition 1.8 (competitiveness) states that the aggregate costs charged to demand
pairs must be reasonable, while Definition 5.2 insists that the cost allocated to each
demand pair is sufficiently large.
5.3 The Steiner Forest Algorithm
Throughout the thesis we have relied upon primal-dual algorithms to supply us
with cost shares. This time we turn our attention to the Steiner forest algorithms
of Agrawal et al. [1] and Goemans and Williamson [38]. The reader might hope
that plugging such an algorithm into the boosted sampling framework and defining
the cost shares ξ according to the corresponding dual solution, would be enough to
obtain a constant-factor approximation for MRoB. While we have no evidence that
this would not work, it is not hard to find examples showing that straightforward
implementations of this idea cannot give β-strict cost-sharing methods for any
constant β, preventing us from using the machinery of Theorem 5.1. On the other
hand, in these families of examples, an O(1)-strict cost-sharing method can be
defined if a few extra edges are bought (extra edges make Definition 5.2 easier
3Remember that a cost-sharing method can be β-strict for one algorithm and
not for another, as strictness depends on the distance dG/F (s, t), and the edge set
F is algorithm-dependent.
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to satisfy, since the shortest-path distance dG/F relative to the bought edges F
decreases). Our main technical result is that buying a few extra edges beyond what
is advocated by the algorithms of [1, 38] always suffices for defining an O(1)-uni-
strict cost-sharing method, enabling the application of Theorem 5.1. (The question
whether it suffices to obtain full β-strictness remains open, although Section 5.5
makes a promising first step in this direction.)
1 + ε 11
s t
Figure 5.1: The Goemans-Williamson algorithm does not support strict cost shar-
ing. In this figure, there are 2n + 1 source-sink pairs, each source-sink pair is
connected by a dotted line. The cost share of the (s, t) pair is O(1/n + ), but
since on the input D − (s, t), the G-W stops just before building the s-t edge,
augmenting to satisfy the (s, t) pair costs us 1 + ε.
5.3.1 The Algorithm PD and the Cost Shares ξ
In this subsection we show how to extend the algorithms of [1, 38] to “build a
few extra edges” while remaining constant-factor approximation algorithms for
the Steiner forest problem. We also describe our cost-sharing method.
Recall that we are given a graph G = (V,E) and a set D of source-sink pairs
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{(sk, tk)}. Let D be the set of demands — the vertices that are either sources
or sinks in D (without loss of generality, all demands are distinct). It will be
convenient to associate a cost share ξ(D, j) with each demand j ∈ D; the cost
share ξ(G,D, (s, t)) is then just ξ(D, s) + ξ(D, t). Note that we have also dropped
the reference to G; in the sequel, the cost shares are always w.r.t. G.
Before defining our algorithm, we review the LP relaxation and the correspond-
ing LP dual of the Steiner forest problem that was used in [38]:
min
∑
e
cexe (SF-LP)
x(δ(S)) ≥ 1 ∀ valid S (5.2)
xe ≥ 0
max
∑
S⊆V valid
yS (SF-DP)
∑
S⊆V :e∈δ(S)
yS ≤ ce (5.3)
yS ≥ 0,
where a set S is valid if for some i, it contains precisely one of si, ti. Though yS is
defined only for such sets, we can define yS for all subsets S of V , as long as these
new variables do not contribute to the objective function of the dual.
We now describe a general way to define primal-dual algorithms for the Steiner
forest problem. As is standard for the primal-dual approach, the algorithm with
maintain a feasible (fractional) dual, initially the all-zero dual, and a primal inte-
gral solution (a set of edges), initially the empty set. The algorithm will terminate
with a feasible Steiner forest, which will be proved approximately optimal with
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the dual solution (which is a lower bound on the optimal cost by weak LP dual-
ity). The algorithms of [1, 38] arise as a particular instantiation of the following
algorithm. Our presentation is closer to [1], where the “reverse delete step” of
Goemans and Williamson [38] is implicit; this version of the algorithm is more
suitable for our analysis.
Our algorithm has a notion of time, initially 0 and increasing at a uniform
rate. At any point in time, some demands will be active and others inactive. All
demands are initially active, and eventually become inactive. The vertex set is
also partitioned into clusters, which can again be either active or inactive. In
our algorithm, a cluster will be one or more connected components (w.r.t. the
currently built edges). Initially, each vertex is a cluster, and the demands are the
active clusters. We will consider different rules by which demands and clusters
become active or inactive. To maintain dual feasibility, whenever the constraint
(5.3) for some edge e between two clusters S and S ′ becomes tight (i.e., first holds
with equality), the clusters are merged and replaced by the cluster S∪S ′. We raise
dual variables of active clusters until there are no more such clusters.
We have not yet specified how an edge can get built. Toward this end, we
define a (time-varying) equivalence relation R on the demand set. Initially, all
demands lie in their own equivalence class; these classes will only merge with time.
When two active clusters are merged, we merge the equivalence classes of all active
demands in the two clusters. Since inactive demands cannot become active, this
rule ensures that all active demands in a cluster are in the same equivalence class.
We build enough edges to maintain the following invariant: the demands in
the same equivalence class are connected by built edges. This clearly holds at the
beginning, since the equivalence classes are all singletons. When two active clusters
98
meet, the invariant ensures that, in each cluster, all active demands lie in a common
connected component. To maintain the invariant, we join these two components
by adding a path between them. Building such paths without incurring a large
cost is simple but somewhat subtle; Agrawal et al. [1] (and implicitly, Goemans
and Williamson [38]) show how to accomplish it. We will not repeat their work
here, and instead refer the reader to [1].
Remark 5.3 For the reader more familiar with the exposition of Goemans and
Williamson [38], let us give an (informal) alternate description of the network out-
put by the algorithm given above. Specifically, we grow active clusters uniformly,
and when any two clusters merge, we build an edge between them. At the end,
we perform a reverse-delete step—when looking at an edge e, if e lies on the path
between some x and y with (x, y) in the final relation R, then we keep the edge,
else we delete it. The reader will notice that the network finally output by this
new description is exactly the same as the one previously given; however, they may
not be the same at intermediate points of the execution, and hence we will not use
this restatement in the rest of the paper.
Specifying the rule by which clusters are deemed active or inactive now gives
us two different algorithms:
1. Algorithm GW(G,D): A demand si is active if the current cluster contain-
ing it does not contain ti. A cluster is active as long as it contains at least
one active demand. This implementation of the algorithm is equivalent to
the algorithms of Agrawal et al. [1] and Goemans and Williamson [38].
2. Algorithm Timed(G,D, T ): This algorithm takes as an additional input a
function T : V → R≥0 which assigns a stopping time to each vertex. (We
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can also view T as a vector with coordinates indexed by V .) A vertex j is
active at time τ if j ∈ D and τ ≤ T (j). (T is defined for vertices not in D
for future convenience, but such values are irrelevant.) As before, a cluster
is said to be active if at least one demand in it is active.
To get a feeling for Timed(G,D, T ), consider the following procedure: run the
algorithm GW(G,D) and set TD(j) to be the time at which vertex j becomes inac-
tive during this execution. (If j /∈ D, then TD(j) is set to zero.) Since the period for
which a vertex stays active in the two algorithms GW(G,D) and Timed(G,D, TD)
is the same, they clearly have identical outputs.
The Timed algorithm gives us a principled way to essentially force the GW
algorithm to build additional edges: run the Timed algorithm with a vector of
demand activity times that is larger than what is naturally induced by the GW
algorithm.
The Algorithm PD: The central algorithm, Algorithm PD(G,D) is obtained
thus: run GW(G,D) to get the time vector TD; then run Timed(G,D, γTD)—
the timed algorithm with the GW-induced time vector scaled up by a parameter
γ ≥ 1—to get a forest FD. (We will fix the value of γ later in the analysis.)4
The fact that FD is a feasible Steiner network for D is easily verified, using the
two facts that each demand pair (si, ti) was connected at time TD(si) = TD(ti),
and that γ ≥ 1. We now define the cost shares ξ.
4A technical point is that when γ > 1, algorithm PD may raise the dual variables
of vertex sets that are not valid, and hence do not contribute to the value of the
dual objective function. As we will see in Lemma 5.7, however, this will not hinder
our analysis.
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The Cost Shares ξ: For a demand j ∈ D, the cost share ξ(D, j) is the length of
time during the run GW(G,D) in which j was the only active vertex in its cluster.
Formally, let a(j, τ) be the indicator variable for the event that j is the only active
vertex in its cluster at time τ ; then
ξ(D, j) =
∫
a(j, τ) dτ, (5.4)
where the integral is over the entire execution of the algorithm.
Remark 5.4 Note that the cost shares defined by Equation 5.4 do not account for
the full cost of the dual solution y, as the cost of growth of clusters with more than
one active demand is not reflected at all. We could fix this e.g. by splitting the
cost of each such component equally among active demands in that component (by
defining a(j, τ) = 1/|Cj| if j is active, and |Cj| is the number of active terminals in
j’s component); however, this change would not improve our approximation ratio.
In the sequel, we will prove our main technical result:
Theorem 5.5 For any γ ≥ 2, PD is a α = γ + 1-approximation for the Steiner
network problem, and ξ is a β = 2 γ
γ−1
-strict cost-sharing method for PD.
We can pick the parameter γ to optimize the overall approximation ratio. Set-
ting γ = 1 +
√
2 then gives us a 2 +
√
2-approximation algorithm that admits a
2 +
√
2-strict cost-sharing method.5
5The original paper [43] proved Theorem 5.5 with α = 2γ and β = 6γ/(2γ−3).
Shortly after publication of the paper, Gupta and Pa´l (unpublished) simplified the
analysis and showed Theorem 5.5 with β = 2γ/(γ − 1). Finally, ideas of Bechetti,
Ko¨nemann and Leonardi [18] led to an improved α = γ + 1.
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5.4 Proof of Theorem 5.5
We first show that algorithm PD is a γ + 1-approximation algorithm for Steiner
forest. We begin with an intuitive monotonicity lemma, which implies that the set
of edges built by algorithm PD is monotone in the parameter γ.
Lemma 5.6 Let T and T ′ be two time vectors with T (j) ≤ T ′(j) for all demands
j ∈ D. Let R(τ) and R′(τ) be the connectedness equivalence relations at time τ in
Timed(G,D, T ) and Timed(G,D, T ′) respectively. Then, R(τ) ⊆ R′(τ), for any τ ,
that is , whenever a pair of vertices is connected in R, it must also be connected
in R′.
Proof. The lemma can be proved by straightforward, if somewhat tedious
induction on the time τ . At time τ = 0 both relations are empty, and all clusters
are singleton. By analyzing the two executions, it is atraightforward to verify that
the clusters in Timed(G,D, T ) are always subsets of clusters of Timed(G,D, T ′),
and that R(τ) ⊆ R′(τ) at all times.
We can now prove the claimed approximation ratio.
Lemma 5.7 The cost of the Steiner forest FD constructed by algorithm PD for
instance (G,D) is at most (γ + 1) ∑S yS ≤ (γ + 1) c(F ∗D), where F ∗D is an optimal
Steiner forest for (G,D).
Proof. First, we claim that the cost of FD is at most 2
∑
S y
′
S. This follows
from the arguments in Agrawal et al. [1] (since our algorithm builds paths between
merging clusters as in [1]).
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We next relate
∑
S y
′
S to the cost of an optimal Steiner forest, via the feasible
dual solution {yS}. We claim that
∑
S
y′S ≤ (γ + 1)/2
∑
S
yS, (*)
provided γ ≥ 1.
Toward this end, we look at the behavior of active clusters in the execution
Timed(G,D, γTD) over time, and charge the cost of their growth to clusters in
GW(G,D). At any time τ , we distinguish two types of active clusters in the
execution Timed(G,D, γTD):
1. Type 1 cluster contains at least one demand j that is not satisfied in the
execution GW(G,D) at time τ (i.e. j is not in the same cluster as its pair j ′
in GW(G,D)).
2. Type 2 cluster only contains satisfied demands (i.e. every demand j ∈ C
is connected to its pair j ′ in GW(G,D) at time τ).
Note that in the beginning, all clusters are singleton denamds, and hence are
of type 1. Note that at any time τ , Lemma 5.6 implies that each type 1 cluster C
is a superset of some cluster C ′ of the execution GW(G,D), and hence the cost of
growing C can be charged to C ′.
The only way we may arrive at a type 2 cluster C is when a demand pair
(si, ti) gets satisfied in the execution GW(G,D). This happens by merging two
active clusters C ′1 and C
′
2 in GW(G,D), forming an inactive cluster C ′ = C ′1 ∪ C ′2.
Note that this happens exactly at time τ = TD(si, ti). We will charge the cost of
growing the type 2 cluster C to the expense of creating the inactive cluster C ′.
Note that the cluster C will get deactivated by time γτ , an hence has at most
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(γ − 1)τ lifetime remaining. On the other hand, each of the clusters C ′1, C ′2 must
have spent at least τ money on growing each. Thus if we charge the cost of growing
C to C ′, we overcharge C ′ by a factor at most (γ − 1)/2.
Since each cluster of GW(G,D) is charged at most its cost for type 1 clusters
and at most (γ − 1)/2 for type 2 clusters, the inequality (*) follows. As ∑S yS is
a lower bound on the optimal cost c(F ∗D) (by LP duality), the lemma is proved.
Lemma 5.8 The function ξ satisfies
∑
(s,t)∈D
ξ(G,D, (s, t)) =
∑
j∈D
ξ(D, j) ≤
∑
S
yS ≤ c(F ∗D).
Proof. At any point τ in time,
∑
j a(j, τ) ≤ a(τ), since each active cluster
can have at most one demand j with non-zero a(j, τ). Thus
∫ ∑
j a(j, τ)dτ ≤∫
a(τ)dτ =
∑
S yS.
5.4.1 Proof of Strictness
We first recall some notation we will use often. The algorithm PD(G,D) first
runs GW(G,D) to find a time vector TD, and then runs Timed(G,D, γTD) to build
a forest FD. Let (s, t) be a new source-sink pair. Define D′ = D ∪ {(s, t)},
D′ = D ∪ {s, t} and let TD′ be the time vector obtained by running GW(G,D′).
Our sole remaining hurdle is the following theorem, asserting the strictness of our
cost-sharing method ξ for the algorithm PD.
Theorem 5.9 (Strictness) Let (s, t) be a source-sink pair 6∈ D, and let D ′ =
D + (s, t) denote the demand set obtained by adding this new pair to D. Then
the length of the shortest path dG/FD(s, t) between s and t in G/FD is at most
β(ξ(D′, s) + ξ(D′, t)), where β = 2γ
γ−1
.
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Simplifying our goals
The main difficulty in proving Theorem 5.9 is that the addition of the new pair
(s, t) may change the behavior of primal-dual algorithms for Steiner forest in fairly
unpredictable ways. In particular, it is difficult to argue about the relationship
between the two algorithms we care about: (1) the algorithm Timed(G,D, γTD)
that gives us the forest FD, and (2) the algorithm GW(G,D′) = Timed(G,D′, TD′)
that gives us the cost-shares. The difficulty of understanding the sensitivity of
primal-dual algorithms to small perturbations of the input is well known, and has
been studied in detail in other contexts by Garg [33] and Charikar and Guha [24].
In this section, we apply some transformations to the input data to partially
avoid the detailed analyses of [24, 33]. In particular, we will obtain a new graph H
from G (with analogous demand sets DH and D
′
H), as well as a new time vector TH
so that it now suffices to relate (1’) the algorithm Timed(H,DH , γTH) and (2’) the
algorithm Timed(H,D′H , TH). In the rest of this section, we will define the new
graph and time vector; Section 5.4.1 will show that this transition is kosher (i.e.
that the reductions satisfy all the necessary invariants), and then Sections 5.4.1
and 5.4.2 will complete the argument.
A simpler time vector T : To begin, let us note that the time vectors TD and
TD′ may be very different, even though the two are obtained from instances that
differ only in the presence of the pair (s, t). However, a monotonicity property
does hold till time TD′(s) = TD′(t), as the following lemma shows:
Lemma 5.10 The set of tight edges at time τ ≤ TD′(s) during the run of the algo-
rithm GW(G,D) is a subset of the set of tight edges at the same time in GW(G,D ′).
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Proof of Lemma 5.10: Since τ ≤ TD′(s), both s and t are active at time τ in
GW(G,D′). Any cluster that has not merged yet with clusters containing s or t has
the same behavior in both runs. A cluster that merges with a cluster containing s
or t will continue to grow. So compared with GW(G,D), only more edges can get
tight in GW(G,D′).
Corollary 5.11 Let T be the vector obtained by truncating TD′ at time TD′(s),
i.e., T (j) = min(TD′(j), TD′(s)). Then for all demands j ∈ D, T (j) ≤ TD(j).
Proof of Corollary 5.11: If TD′(s) ≤ TD(j), the claim clearly holds. If TD(j) <
TD′(s), then there is a tight path from j to its partner at time TD(j). But the
monotonicity Lemma 5.10 implies that these edges must be tight in GW(G,D′) at
time TD(j) as well, and hence T (j) = TD′(j) ≤ TD(j).
The vector T is now a time vector for which we can say something interesting
for both runs. Suppose we were to now run the algorithm Timed(G,D, γT ) as
the second step of PD(G,D) (instead of Timed(G,D, γTD) prescribed by the algo-
rithm). By the monotonicity results in Lemma 5.6 and Corollary 5.11, the edges
that are made tight in Timed(G,D, γT ) are a subset of those in Timed(G,D, γTD).
Hence it suffices to show that the distance between s and t in the forest resulting
from Timed(G,D, γT ) is small; this is made precise by the following construction.
A simpler graph H: Let us look at the equivalence relation defined by the run
of Timed(G,D, γT ) over the demands, which we shall denote by R. (Recall that
for j1, j2 ∈ D, (j1, j2) ∈ R if at some time τ during the run, they are both active
and the clusters containing them meet. Equivalently, at some time τ , both j1
and j2 are active and some path between them becomes tight.) Similarly, let the
equivalence relation RD be obtained by running Timed(G,D, γTD). Lemma 5.6
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and Corollary 5.11 now imply that the former is a refinement of the latter, i.e.,
R ⊆ RD. (Note that this also means that the equivalence classes of RD can be
obtained by taking unions of the equivalence classes of R.)
Since FD connects all the demands that lie in the same equivalence class of
RD, the fact that R ⊆ RD implies that it connects up all demands in the same
equivalence class in R as well. Hence, to show Theorem 5.9 that there is a short
s-t path in G/FD it suffices to show the following result.
Theorem 5.12 (Strictness restated) Let H be the graph obtained from G by
identifying all the vertices that lie in the same equivalence class of R. Then the
distance between s and t in H is at most β(ξ(D′, s) + ξ(D′, t)).
Relating the runs on G and H
We will need some new (but fairly obvious) notation: note that each vertex in H
either corresponds to a single vertex in G, or to a subset of the demands D that
formed an equivalence class of R. The vertices of the latter type are naturally
called the demands in H, and denoted by DH . The set D
′
H is just DH ∪ {s, t}.
Each demand j ∈ D′H has a set Cj ⊆ D′ of demands that were identified to
form j. A new time-vector TH is defined by setting TH(s) = TH(t) = T (s) = T (t);
furthermore, for j ∈ DH , we set TH(j) = maxx∈Cj T (x).
Going from Timed(G,D, γTD) to Timed(H,DH , γTH)
Note that H was obtained from G by identifying some demands; the edge sets of
G and H are exactly the same. We now show they behave identically as well. Let
us denote the execution of Timed(H,DH , γTH) by E .
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Lemma 5.13 The set of tight edges in the two runs Timed(G,D, γT ) and E at
any time τ are the same.
The following monotonicity lemma will be used in the following proofs, and we
omit the simple proof here:
Lemma 5.14 For all γ ≥ 1, the set of tight edges in Timed(H,DH , γTH) contains
the tight edges in Timed(G,D, γT ). Similarly, the tight edges of Timed(H,D ′H , γTH)
contain those in Timed(G,D′, γT ).
Proof of Lemma 5.13: By Lemma 5.14, we know that the latter edges
contain the former; we just have to prove the converse. For a demand j ∈ DH , we
claim that each demand x ∈ Cj is in some active cluster of Timed(G,D, γT ) till
time γTH(j). Suppose not: let x ∈ Cj be in an inactive cluster at time τ < γTH(j).
By the definition of the equivalence relation R, no more demands are added to
the equivalence class of x (which is Cj). But then maxy∈Cj γT (y) ≤ τ < γTH(j),
a contradiction. Hence all demands in Cj are in active clusters till time γTH(j).
Thus, in the run GW(G,D, γT ), we had grown regions around these demands till
time τ , giving us the same tight edges as in E .
Corollary 5.15 For all γ ≥ 1, an active cluster at time τ during the run of E
contains only one active demand. In particular, two active clusters never merge
during the entire run of the algorithm.
Proof of Corollary 5.15: Suppose j 6= j ′ ∈ DH are two active demands in
the same (active) cluster at time τ . Let Cj and Cj′ be the corresponding sets of
demands in D respectively. By Lemma 5.13, the set of edges that become tight at
time τ is the same as that in Timed(G,D, γT ), and hence there must be demands
x ∈ Cj, x′ ∈ Cj′ which lie in the same active cluster of Timed(G,D, γT ) at time τ .
108
By an argument identical to that in the proof of the previous lemma, there must
be active demands y ∈ Cj and y′ ∈ Cj′ in the same cluster as well. Hence Cj = C ′j
by the definition of the equivalence class, contradicting that j 6= j ′.
Note that this implies that the run E is very simple: each demand j ∈ DH
grows a cluster around itself; though this cluster may merge with inactive clusters,
it never merges with another active one.
Going from Timed(G,D′, TD′) to Timed(H,D
′
H , TH):
Recall that the cost shares ξ(D′, s) and ξ(D′, t) are defined by running GW(G,D′) =
Timed(G,D′, T ′D) and using the formula (5.4). The following lemma shows that it
suffices to look instead at Timed(H,D′H , TH) in order to define the cost-share. (Let
E ′ be short-hand for the execution Timed(H,D′H , TH).)
Lemma 5.16 In E ′, if s (respectively, t) is the only active vertex in its cluster at
time τ , then a(s, τ) = 1 (resp., a(t, τ) = 1) in the run Timed(G,D′, TD′).
Proof of Lemma 5.16: Suppose a(s, τ) = 0 in Timed(G,D′, TD′), and some
active demand j 6= s lies in s’s cluster at time τ . By the definition of T , j and s
are both active in the same cluster in Timed(G,D′, T ) as well. Now by Lemma 5.14,
j and s must lie in the same cluster in E ′ too; furthermore, they must both be
active (by the definition of TH). This contradicts the assumption of the theorem.
Corollary 5.17 Let alone(s) be the total time in the run E ′ during which s is the
only active vertex in its cluster, and define alone(t) analogously. Then ξ(D ′, s) +
ξ(D′, t) ≥ alone(s) + alone(t).
A property similar to Corollary 5.15 can also be proved about the run E ′.
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Lemma 5.18 Let τst be the time at which s and t become part of the same cluster
in E ′. Any active cluster at time τ ≤ τst in E ′ contains at most one active demand
from DH , and at most one active demand from the set {s, t}.
Proof of Lemma 5.18: Let C be an active cluster in E ′ at time τ with two active
demands j, j ′ ∈ DH . If C contains neither s nor t, then C is also a cluster (with
two active demands) in E at the same time τ , which contradicts the implication of
Corollary 5.15.
Hence C must contain one of s or t (in addition to j, j ′); it cannot contain both
since τ ≤ τst. Suppose it has s; we claim that we can prove that j and j ′ must lie
in the same cluster in E at time 2 τ . (For this to make sense, we have to assume
that γ ≥ 2.) To prove this, consider a tight path between s and j in E ′ at time
τ—since they both lie in the same cluster, such a path must exist. Since s has been
active for time τ , the portion of this path which is tight due to a s’s cluster has
length at most τ . Now consider the same path in E at time τ — all but a portion
of length at most τ of this path must already be tight. (Note that though we have
dropped both s and t, we lose only τ , since no part of the path could have been
made tight by t’s cluster. If this were to happen, then τst < τ , which is assumed
not to happen.) Hence the cluster containing j will contain s after another τ units
of time. The same argument can be made for j ′. But this would imply that j and
j ′ would lie in the same cluster in E at time 2τ , contradicting Corollary 5.15.
The path between s and t
Lemma 5.19 The vertices s and t lie in the same tree in the Steiner forest output
by E ′.
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Proof of Lemma 5.19: By the definition of T , s and t lie in the same cluster
at time T (s) = T (t). Since TH(s) = TH(t) = T (s), applying Lemma 5.14 implies
that s and t lie in the same cluster in E ′ as well. Since they are both active at the
time their clusters merge, they lie in the same connected component of the Steiner
forest.
This simple lemma gives us a path P between s and t in H whose length we
will argue about. Note that this path is already formed at time τst, and hence the
rest of the argument can (and will) be done truncating the time vector at time τst
instead of at TH(s).
A useful fact to remember is that all edges in P must be tight in the run of E ′.
The proof of the following theorem, along with Corollary 5.17, will complete the
proof of Theorem 5.12.
Theorem 5.20 (Strictness restated again) The length of the path P is bounded
by β(alone(s) + alone(t)).
We will prove the theorem with β = 2γ/(γ − 1). Before we proceed, here is
some more syntactic sugar:
Given an execution of an algorithm, a layer is a tuple (C, I = [τ1, τ2)), where
C ⊆ V is an active cluster between times τ1 and τ2. If I = [τ1, τ2) is a time interval,
its thickness is τ2 − τ1. A layering L of an execution is a set of layers such that,
for every time τ and every active cluster C, there is exactly one layer (C, I) ∈ L
such that τ ∈ I.
Given any layering L, another layering L′ can be obtained by splitting some
layer (C, I) ∈ L—i.e., replacing it with two layers (C, [τ1, τˆ )), (C, [τˆ , τ2)) for some
τˆ ∈ (τ1, τ2). Conversely, two layers with the same set C and consecutive time inter-
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vals can be merged. It is easy to see that given some layering of an execution, all
other layerings of the same execution can be obtained by splittings and mergings.
We fix layerings of the two executions E and E ′, which we denote by L and L′
respectively. The only property we desire of these layerings is this: if (C, I) ∈ L
and (C ′, I ′) ∈ L′ with 1/γI ∩ I ′ 6= ∅, then I = γI ′. (I.e., I = [γτ1, γτ2) and
I ′ = [τ1, τ2).) It is easy to see that such a condition can be satisfied by making
some splittings in L and L′.
Lemma 5.18 implies that each active layer (C, I) ∈ L′ in categorized thus:
• alone: The only active demand in C is either s and t. Assign the layer to
that demand.
• shared: C contains one active demand from DH and one of s and t. The
layer is assigned to the active demand from DH .
• unshared: The only active demand in C is from DH . Again, the layer is
assigned to that demand.
Note that the total thickness of the lonely layers is a lower bound on alone(s) +
alone(t). Furthermore, since P consists only of tight edges in E ′, the length of P is
exactly the total thickness of the layers of L′ that P crosses. If L, S, and U denote
the total thickness of the alone, shared and unshared layers that P crosses, then
len(P) = L+ S + U (5.5)
Of course, any layer (C, I) ∈ L′ that crosses P must have I ⊆ [0, τst], since the
path is tight at time τst. Hence their corresponding layers have time intervals that
lie in [0, γτst].
Note that the total thickness of the layers of L that P crosses is a lower bound
on its length. This suggests the following plan for the rest of the proof: for each
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shared or unshared layer in L′, there is a corresponding distinct layer in L that is γ
times thicker. In an ideal world, each crossing of a layer in L′ would also correspond
to a crossing of the corresponding layer in L; in this case, γ(S + U) ≤ len(P), and
hence L ≥ γ−1
γ
len(P). Sadly, we do not live in an ideal world and the argument is
a bit more involved than this, though not by much.
Mapping shared and unshared layers of L′: Each such layer `′ = (C ′, I)
is assigned to a demand j ∈ DH ∩ C ′. Since j is active during the interval γI
in E , there must be a layer ` = (C, γI) ∈ L containing j—this is defined to be
the layer corresponding to `′. (The properties of the layerings ensure that the
two time intervals are just rescalings of each other by a factor γ.) Furthermore,
since each layer in L contains only one active vertex, the mapping is one-one. It
remains to show that crossings of P by layers is preserved (approximately) by this
correspondence.
Lemma 5.21 Each unshared layer `′ = (C ′, I = [τ1, τ2)) is crossed by P either
zero or two times. Furthermore, if its corresponding layer is ` = (C, γI), then
C ′ ⊆ C.
Proof. Since P begins and ends outside `′, it must cross `′ an even number
of times. Furthermore, P cannot cross `′ more than twice—if it does so, there
must exist vertices j1, j2, and j3 visited by P (in order), such that j1, j3 ∈ C ′, but
j2 /∈ C ′. However, our algorithms ensure that if j1 and j3 lie in the same cluster C ′,
then the edges joining them lie within C ′ as well. This implies that there must be
two disjoint paths between j1 and j2, contradicting that the algorithms construct
a forest.
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For the second part, note that if C ′ is assigned to j and does not contain s or
t at time τ2, then the cluster containing j at time γτ2, i.e., C must contain C
′.
Lemma 5.22 If `′ = (C ′, I = [τ1, τ2)) is a shared layer containing s (resp., t)
which assigned to j, and γ ≥ 2, then its corresponding layer ` = (C, γI) contains
s (resp., t).
Proof of Lemma 5.22: The proof of the first claim is similar to that of
Lemma 5.18; we just sketch the idea again. Consider a tight path between j and
s at time τ1; at most a τ1 portion of it can be tight due to s. Hence by time
γτ1 ≥ 2τ1, the path must be completely tight.
5.4.2 Finally, the book-keeping
Let `′ = (C ′, I) ∈ L′ be an unshared layer that P crosses, and let its corresponding
layer be ` = (C, γI) ∈ L. If v ∈ P ∩ C ′ is a vertex on the path, then v ∈ P ∩ C
by Lemma 5.21. If both s and t are outside C, then P crosses C twice as well,
and we get a contribution of 2γ times the thickness of `′. Suppose not, and s ∈ C
or t ∈ C: then we lose γ times the thickness of ` for each such infringement. For
shared layers `′ (which map to ` ∈ L), Lemma 5.22 implies that we lose only when
s and t both lie inside `. Hence, if W denotes the wastage, the
len(P) ≥ γ(S + U)−W. (5.6)
We bound the wastage in the following way: suppose that `′ = (C ′, I) is a layer
that is wasted (more precisely, we should be talking about a wasted crossing of `
and P), and let ` = (C, γI) be its corresponding layer in L. The reason that `′
is wasted is that for one of the endpoints of P (let it be s), s ∈ C, but s /∈ C ′.
We claim that at this time, s must have been growing alone. Indeed, suppose
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that s was in a shared layer with some terminal j in the time interval I. Then s
and j must have been growing a layer `′1 = (C
′
1, I) in L′ that is distinct from `′,
since s /∈ `′. But then the layer `1 = (c1, γI), corresponding to `′1 (which must be
distinct from `, as they contain distinct active terminals) intersects ` in L, which
is a contradiction. Thus, for each wasted layer there is at least one lonely layer
and hence
γL ≥ W. (5.7)
Adding up Inequalities 5.6 and 5.7 and subtracting a γ-multiple of Equation
5.5 we obtain
2γL ≥ (γ − 1)len(P ). (5.8)
Rearranging, we get
alone(s) + alone(t) ≥ L ≥ 2γ
γ − 1 len(P), (5.9)
proving Theorem 5.20 with β = 2γ
γ−1
.
5.5 Group Rent-or-Buy
We can generalize our result a little bit. Instead of associating each user j with
two terminals (sj, tj), we allow each user j to have a group gj = {t1, t2, . . . , tk} of
terminals (k ≥ 2). Each user wishes to have her terminals
In the regular Multicommodity Rent-or-Buy setting, each user is j associated
with a pair of vertices that she desires to connect by a path. In the Group Rent-
or-Buy problem we associate each user j with a set Sj of terminals (instead of
just a pair (sj, tj)) she wishes to be connected by a Steiner tree. The goal then is
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to design a collection of Steiner trees, one for each user, to minimize the overall
cost. For each edge e we can either buy it at cost M ce (in which case any number
of trees can use it at no additional cost), or rent it, in which case we pay the cost
ce multiplied by the number of trees using the edge e.
The corresponding buy-only problem is what we call the Group Steiner For-
est6 problem: buy a subset of edges, so that each set Sj belongs to a single con-
nected component (which, without loss of generality, is a tree). Note that although
Group Steiner Forest and regular Steiner Forest are equivalent as far as
approximation algrithms are concerned (as each group Sj = {t1, t2, . . . , tk} can
be simulated by the terminal pairs (t1, t2), (t2, t3),. . . ,(tk−1, tk)), Group Steiner
Forest is strictly more general when cost sharing is concerned. In particular, to
obtain a uni-strict cost sharing method, we must be able to exhibit an augmenta-
tion procedure that can augment for a whole set Sj, not just a terminal pair (sj, tj)
(in which case, finding the shortest sj-tj path was sufficient). We are able to prove
the following.
Theorem 5.23 There is a 1 + γ approximation algorithm for the Group Steiner
Forest problem, that admits a 4γ/(γ−2)-strict cost sharing function. Hence (setting
γ = 2 + 2
√
2) there is a 7 + 4
√
2 ≤ 12.6-approximation algorithm for the Group
Rent-or-Buy problem.
Corollary 5.24 There is a 12.6-approximation algorithm for the Stoc(Unrooted
Steiner Tree) problem from Section 4.6.3.
The proof of Theorem 5.23 goes along lines similar to the proof in the single
pair case. We make the cost share of a set Sj to pay for the growth of all clusters
6This is different from the Group Steiner Tree, where a tree is sought that visits
one vertex from each group. We hope this name will not be a source of confusion.
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whose only active terminals are those in Sj. Then, we pick the unique minimal tree
constructed by the uninflated algorithm that connects the Sj terminals, and argue
that this tree can be partially paid for by the cost share. Let D = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk}
be the set of demand groups.
The Algorithm PD: As before, we first run the agorithm GW(G,D), and obtain
a time vector TD, where TDt is the time when the terminal t ∈ Sj got satisfied.
Note that the members of a group Sj get satisfied at the same time, when they all
join into a single cluster, hence TD(t) is the same for all terminals in Sj. Then, we
run the timed algorithm Timed(G,D, γTD) with the time vector inflated by γ, to
obtain a set of dual variables {yS} and a forest FD.
The Cost Shares ξ: We want the cost share of a group Sj of users to account
for the growth of components that grow solely because they contain terminals from
Sj. Formally, let a(j, τ) be the number of active clusters that contain a terminal
from Sj but do not contain any active terminals outside Sj, in the execution of
GW(G,D). We define the cost share of Sj to be
ξ(D, j) =
∫
a(j, τ) dτ, (5.10)
where the integral is over the entire execution of the algorithm.
The Augmentation Algorithm AugA: Previously, when each group Sj con-
sisted only of one terminal pair, it was clear that the best we can do is to find a
shortest path between these two terminals in the graph G/FD. With larger groups
Sj, we need to construct a Steiner tree on the set Sj in G/FD. While we could use
any general purpose Steiner tree algorithm available (which is probably what we
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would recommend in a practical implementation), in the course of our proof we
will construct a specific Steiner tree on Sj which we use to show strictness. (Our
proof is constructive, and the tree can be constructed in polynomial time.)
5.5.1 Proving strictness
To prepare the stage, we work through the same chain of reductions as before.
We take a set of demand groups D, an additional demand group g /∈ D, and let
D′ = D ∪ {g}. We run the algorithm GW(G,D + g) to compute the cost share
ξ(D + g, g) of the group g, and to obtain a time vector TD+g. We truncate TD+g
at the time when group g got satisfied (call the truncated time vector T ), and run
Timed(G,D+ g, γT ). We create a new graph H by contracting all pairs of vertices
u, v that were together active in the same component. The final comparison takes
place between the executions E ′ = Timed(H,D + g, T ) and E = Timed(H,D, γT ).
5.5.2 The tree spanning terminals of g
The terminals of g end up in the same cluster in the execution ′, and hence are
in the same connected component of the forest output by ′. Let P be the unique
minimal subtree of this forest that spans all the terminals in S. Our goal is to
prove that the cost of P is bounded by βξ(D + g, g).
We label each layer `′ = (C, [τ1, τ2)) in the execution E ′ as lonely, shared, and
unshared as follows.
• lonely: all active demands inside C belong to S.
• shared: there is an active demand from S, as well as from D.
• unshared: S ∩ C = ∅.
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Note that now a lonely or shared layer may contain more than one terminbal
from S, and a shared layer may contain multiple terminals outside S.
Mapping shared and unshared layers of L′ to layers of L: Each shared
or unshared layer `′ = (C ′, [τ1, τ2)) ∈ L′ contains at least one active terminal
t ∈ C ′ ∩ D, and hence there is a unique layer ` = (C, [γτ1, γτ2)) ∈ L such that
t ∈ C. We thus map `′ to `. Note that some shared layers `′ may contain more
than one active terminal t ∈ D; we choose one of them arbitrarily. This way, each
shared or unshared layer from L′ is mapped to a layer in L; note that since every
layer in L contains only one active terminal, two layers from L′ never map to the
same layer ` ∈ L.
We claim that the image ` of every shared layer `′ contains at least one terminal
t ∈ g. This can be verified along the lines of Lemma 5.22. For every unshared layer
`′ = (C ′, I), we know that its image ` = (C, γI) is “larger”, i.e. C ′ ⊆ C. Hence, for
any shared or unshared layer `′ that intersects P we know that its inflated image `
must either also intersect P, or P must be fully contained in `. We call such layers
wasted.
Let L, S, and U be the total thickness of lonely, shared and unshared layers
that intersect the tree P. Note that this time we count each layer only once in the
respective sum, irrespective of how many intersections it has. Let us express the
total length of the tree as
|P| = L+ S + U +X, (5.11)
where X accounts for all the extra intersections of layers that cross P more than
once (for example, if a lonely layer intersects P three times, it is counted once in
L and twice in X).
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Now, realizing that each layer in L′ carves out a contiguous part of the tree,
we note that at any time τ , the total number of intersections is at most twice the
number of distinct layers intersecting P, and hence
X ≤ L + S + U. (5.12)
As before, the γ times the total thickness of shared and unshared layers inter-
secting P that are not wasted is a lower bound on the cost of P:
γ(S + U −W ) ≤ |P|. (5.13)
Finally, we argue that for every layer wasted, there must be a lonely layer
growing at the same time. Indeed, suppose that for a shared or unshared layer
`′ = (C ′, [τ1, τ2)), its inflated image ` = (C, [γτ1, γτ2)) contains the whole tree.
Consider a terminal t from g that was not a part of the cluster C ′ at time τ1. We
claim that t must not have been in a shared layer `′t at time τ1; if this was the case,
the inflated image `t of `
′
t would have intersected P, and hence have a nonempty
intersection with `, which is not possible. Hence we conclude that t was growing
in a lonely layer in the time interval [τ1, τ2).
W ≤ L. (5.14)
Combining these inequalities (multiplying 5.11 and 5.12 by γ and 5.13 by 2 and
5.14 by 2γ and adding up) we obtain
(γ − 2)|P| ≤ 4γL. (5.15)
Thus, the augmenting tree costs at most 4γ/(γ − 2) ξ(D + g, g).
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